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ABSTRACT 
CARE WORK IN CHILE’S SEGREGATED CITIES 
SEPTEMBER 2021 
MANUEL GARCIA, B.A., UNIVERSIDAD DE CHILE 
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Directed by: Professor M.V. Lee Badgett 
 
This project combines diverse theoretical and methodological tools to examine the 
relationship between space and care work in Chile. The chapters are stand-alone articles 
that come together to tell a single story. The social production of urban space has 
marginalized thousands of female caregivers from the labor market as Chile’s care 
system unravels. I argue that community caregiving could simultaneously improve the 
conditions of caregivers and dependents. 
           Chapter 1 examines the role of residential segregation in reproducing Chile’s 
meager female labor market participation rates. I use spatial and econometric analysis 
to show that the social forces that segregate Santiago create a landscape that penalizes 
the labor market participation of individuals with mobility constraints. Unpaid care is 
especially restrictive to mobility. Hence, caregivers residing in economically marginalized 
regions are significantly less likely to participate in the labor market. Thanks to the 
gendering of care, female caregivers’ participation is the most negatively affected by the 
city’s residential configuration. 
 viii 
           In Chapter 2, I use political economy analysis to examine the capability of the 
Chilean system to meet the growing demand for adult care in a rapidly aging population. 
Moreover, the care system continues to rely excessively on unpaid family members (i.e., 
women) to care for adult dependents. However, Chile’s demographic transition has also 
led to transformations in dependents’ family structures. With the help of econometric 
analysis, I show that dependents living in households where the patriarchal division of 
labor is unfeasible are significantly less likely to receive assistance. Additionally, using 
Machine Learning methods, I demonstrate that dependents are increasingly living in 
these types of households. 
           Chapter 3 explores the possibility of replacing the family as the primary space of 
adult care for the community. It uses theoretical tools to analyze the economic 
implications of a state-funded program hiring caregivers to assist adult dependents in 
their communities. Since adult dependency rates are higher in economically 
marginalized communities, the program would disproportionately benefit the urban 
poor, especially women. Additionally, the program would boost aggregate demand and 
aggregate supply, leading to real economic growth. A crucial factor determining the 
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INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECT 
This dissertation is the product of four years of thinking about space and work. A project 
combining various analytical and methodological frameworks in stand-alone articles 
which, together, tell a single story. The narrative illustrates that the social production of 
space is fundamental in the accumulation of gender and economic inequalities. 
Therefore, it should play a central role in overcoming them. 
           The project is centered in Chile. A country where profound economic inequality 
has solidified in residentially segregated cities (Garreton et al., 2020). This urban 
configuration entails remarkably different experiences for the poor and the rich, beyond 
their distinct economic capabilities. In the pages that follow, I argue that this landscape 
thoroughly conditions the experience of providing and receiving care. 
           Care is an essential activity. Without it, any social order is unfeasible. However, 
unlike other essential activities, most care work goes unpaid. Centuries of patriarchal 
conditioning have naturalized us into relying on women’s free supply of care. Moreover, 
since care is a public good, its benefits are not accrued by those who bear the costs of 
producing it (Folbre, 2021). Patriarchal systems, however, do not operate in a void. They 
interact with other social and spatial structures producing differences in the experience 
of caregiving. Therefore, not all women experience caregiving in the same way. 
           The first article in this project, “Residential segregation and female labor market 
participation,” is a testament to these differences. The paper underscores the economic 
implications of caring in different neighborhoods of Santiago. The concentration of 
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employment opportunities in the more affluent regions of town characterizes the city. 
Mobility, thus, is an asset for those living in lower-income peripheral neighborhoods. 
           Care entails coupling constraints to mobility (Hagerstrand, 1970; Kwan et al., 
2000). Caring takes place somewhere, at some time, with someone. The restrictive 
nature of coupling constraints severely penalizes caregivers’ urban mobility. Hence, as 
the paper shows, female caregivers in peripheral communities are significantly less likely 
to participate in the labor market than any other social group. 
           Using spatial and econometric analysis, I show that the interaction between the 
patriarchal system and economic segregation fuels two types of inequality. On the one 
hand, it enforces gender inequalities within lower-income peripheral households. On 
the other, it deepens economic inequalities between those living in wealthier regions of 
the city and the urban poor. 
           My second paper, “The limits to care,” examines the conditions of those who need 
care. Specifically, I use political economy analysis to evaluate the capability of the 
Chilean care system to meet the growing demand for adult care. The article finds that 
the system’s over-reliance on unpaid female provision severely limits its ability to supply 
care. Without structural reform, an adult care crisis looms on the horizon. 
           Space is integral to this paper’s analytical framework. Spatial configurations are 
not only concrete, as is the case of cities, but also abstract and imagined. For instance, 
the division of labor, economics most fundamental category, is limited by abstract 
space. Its operation becomes difficult outside certain imagined boundaries (e.g., the 
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market, the nation, the household). Hence, when the space for the division of care labor 
is tight or shrinking, it is unlikely for the system to increase its care supply. 
           Currently, the system relies almost exclusively on a patriarchal division of labor 
limited by the family space. Using econometric analysis, I show that dependents living in 
households where the patriarchal division of labor is severely limited are far less likely to 
receive any assistance. Moreover, with the help of Machine Learning prediction 
methods, I show that dependents are increasingly living in these households. This 
pattern is likely to continue as population aging drives growing dependency rates. 
           This project’s first and second papers underscore the role of space in the 
production of social afflictions. The third one, “An economic case for community care 
aides,” ventures into the theoretical to highlight space as part of the antidote for these 
afflictions. Adult dependency rates are higher in lower-income neighborhoods. Hence, 
there is a spatial correspondence between low female labor market participation rates 
and growing care needs. In this context, I propose the implementation of a Community 
Care Aides (CCA) program. 
           CCAs are caregivers hired and paid by the state to provide care for adult 
dependents in their communities. The CCA stimulates female labor participation 
through two channels. First of all, it allows lower-income women to outsource care to a 
qualified network of caregivers, reducing the coupling constraints of care. Secondly, if 
they choose to continue caring, the program creates local job opportunities that are not 
far from home. 
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           Since it would disproportionately benefit lower-income women, the CCA program 
would reduce inequalities even as it boosts economic growth. Therefore, the program is 
not only a good strategy for increasing the coverage and quality of adult care. Its 
economic implications entail that CCAs can contribute to the inclusive development of 
the Chilean economy
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CHAPTER 1 
RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND FEMALE LABOR MARKET PARTICIPATION 




Every weekend, Gabriela walks Santa Rosa avenue to sell windows. She looks for homes 
displaying cracked or missing windows to offer her services. Her clients are often 
surprised by this 61-year-old Window Repair Woman. “People tell me that this is a 
man’s job”—she says. Marcela, Gabriela’s 31-year-old daughter who has a cognitive 
disability, walks beside her.  Marcela’s care is solely Gabriela’s responsibility, so she has 
always had to bring her daughter along. “We can only work on spacious avenues; 
otherwise, Marcela gets lost”—Gabriela tells me. Gabriela and Marcela live in La 
Pintana, Santiago’s poorest municipal jurisdiction. Given Marcela’s condition, Gabriela 
has had to find ways to provide for her family without moving too far away from home. 
The challenge, however, is that there are very few jobs in La Pintana. Hence, window-
repair.1 
 Gabriela’s experience illustrates the struggle of many low-income caregivers in 
Santiago, Chile’s capital city.  The burden of balancing paid and unpaid activities is 
compounded by an urban environment that agglomerates employment opportunities 
                                                     
1 I interviewed Gabriela in July of 2019.  
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far from their homes. This article analyzes the effects of residential segregation on 
Santiago’s exceptionally low female labor market participation by examining the joint 
constraints of unpaid caregiving and distance to work.    
 Chile ranks second to last in female labor market participation among South 
American countries (Serrano et al. 2019). Within the poorest 20% of population, less 
than a third of working-age women provided labor for pay and nearly half of non-
participants are unable to enter the labor market due to unpaid domestic and care labor 
responsibilities. 2 The different explanations for this phenomenon, as outlined in Section 
II, have failed to account for residential segregation’s role. This is a serious oversight 
considering that over 90% of Chileans live in economically segregated cities (Garreton et 
al. 2020).  
I address this oversight by presenting theoretical and empirical evidence on how 
residential segregation disproportionately affected the labor market participation of less 
educated female caregivers. In doing so, I underscore the intersectional nature of 
Santiago’s segregation, which thus far has been mostly studied from an economic lens 
(Sabatini and Brain 2008; Garreton 2017).   
Section III introduces our theoretical framework. The sexual division of unpaid 
care labor entails mobility constraints which limit women’s ability to travel long 
distances for employment. Moreover, a public transportation system which is not 
designed for the balancing paid and unpaid responsibilities complicates the logistics for 
                                                     




combining these activities (Hanson and Pratt 1995, Kwan 2000, Loukaitou-Sideris 2016). 
Under these conditions, local markets are a more viable option for female labor market 
participation. The concentration of employment opportunities in wealthy 
neighborhoods, hence, presents an unfavorable landscape for low income caregivers’ 
participation. In economic geography, this phenomenon is known as a spatial mismatch 
(Kain 1968; Fernandez and Su 2004; Gobillion et al. 2007). 
 Sections IV through VI compose the empirical analysis of spatial mismatch effects 
over less educated women’s labor market participation. Section IV contextualizes 
Santiago’s residential sorting, highlighting the events that led to the location of the 
urban poor in regions distant from the city’s economic center. Section V introduces the 
primary dataset for analysis, the variables of interests, and some methodological issues 
regarding the quantitative analysis of spatial variables. 
 Our primary dataset is the 2012 Origin Destination Survey (ODS). This survey 
contains geo-referenced information for over 60,000 individuals’ households and more 
than 23,000 employment locations for the greater Santiago region allowing us te 
measure local job density. Job density, our independent variable of interest, is defined as 
the ratio of employment opportunities to working-age residents in a given locality 
(Hellerstein et al. 2008). This variable will vary according to different labor market 
assumptions and, for robustness purposes, this article considers three different models. 
Additionally, Section V shows job density’s spatial distribution in Santiago, underscoring 
the geographical matching of high-density regions with high income and high schooling 
neighborhoods. 
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 Section VI culminates the empirical assessment through the econometric 
analysis of spatial mismatch effects. Considering possible self-selection problems, I show 
that less educated female caregivers are unlikely to sort themselves into high density 
regions. As a result, I restrict the primary analysis to this subpopulation. Avoiding self-
selection problems allows us to perform OLS (with municipal fixed effects) analysis. The 
wide use of this technique makes these findings transparent and accessible. As a 
secondary analysis, spatial mismatch effects are calculated for other subpopulations, 
including non-caregivers and more educated individuals. Moreover, I analyze if spatial 
mismatch affects accessing formal and full-time employment. 
 My findings show that less educated female caregivers’ participation in the labor 
market is significantly lowered in regions with low job density. No other subpopulation 
is affected by residential segregation in this manner. Therefore, I conclude that the 
residential sorting of the city intensifies gender inequalities within less educated 
household even as it reproduces economic inequalities between low- and high-income 
regions of the city. Section VII discusses the implications of our main findings. 
 
II. Chile’s low female labor market participation in the literature 
 
Chile’s low female labor market participation has received an important deal of 
scholarly attention. During the first decade of the 2000s, cultural explanations 
dominated this discussion. Since 2010, however, more structural arguments have 
emerged.  
 9 
Paredes (2003) finds that significant increases in female labor market participation 
rates have only occurred in long durations of high-economic growth. Since prolonged 
periods of economic growth are sporadic, the author predicts that it is unlikely to 
observe sustained growth’s in participation. Larrañaga (2006) offers an idiosyncratic 
reason for low participation rates. He argues that decreasing fertility and marriage rates 
during the 1990s prompted an increase in female participation among middle- and high-
income families over the same time period. Ferrada and Zarzoza (2010) add that age is a 
determining factor. This line of argumentation holds that younger women are more 
likely to participate in the labor market due to cultural changes regarding women’s 
relationship to paid work. Finally, Contreras and Plaza (2010) argue that patriarchal 
values are more prevalent among low-income families, contributing to the low 
participation rate among women in these households. 
Structural explanations regarding the uneven distribution of care responsibilities 
have emerged in the last decade (Encina and Martinez 2009; Contreras et al. 2012; 
Martinez and Perticara 2017). Contreras and his co-authors (2012) find that access to 
private care services has increased women’s labor supply in the middle and upper levels 
of the income distribution. Martinez and Perticara (2017), furthermore, carried out a 
randomized control trial evaluating an after-school program. They found that the 
program increased female participation and employment by 7% and 5%, respectively. 
Although these programs are not available to most of the Chilean population, this 
research underscores how the temporal constraints of unpaid care work penalize female 
labor supply. 
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The spatial constraints to participation have received far less attention. Two 
undertakings have made original contributions in this regard. Puga and Soto (2018) 
argued that the segmented nature of social space plays a significant role in determining 
low-income and less educated women's participation. In particular, they show that 
unequal access to employment information networks (social capital) has reinforced the 
gap in participation rates between women in different economic classes. Asahi (2015), 
on the other hand, found that improvements to Santiago’s public transportation 
network presented more favorable conditions for less educated women’s participation. 
However, none of these works consider the spatial constraints emerging from 
residential segregation for women’s participation in the labor market.  
 
III. Spatial mismatch and gender 
 
Residential segregation is the spatial clustering of a subpopulation sharing one or more 
personal attributes. Race, class, ethnicity, or a combination of these categories are often 
identified as the basis of this phenomenon (Davis 2007; Rothstein 2017). Therefore, 
scholars have analyzed the effects of segregation on labor market outcomes from the 
perspective of these categories (Kain 1968; Wilson 1997; Zenou 2013).  
Gender inequalities emerging from segregation have received far less attention. 
Gender, after all, is rarely the basis of segregation. However, this does not mean that 
segregation is not a gendered experience. People experience class, race, and ethnicity in 
distinctive ways. The mutual constitution of social categories entails that the re-
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articulation of one category will result in the reconfiguration of the rest. Hence, if 
segregation is a racial/class/ethnic phenomenon, it must also be a gendered one. 
This section presents the theoretical mechanisms by which segregation 
conditions labor market access across class and gender.3 In a nutshell, I argue that 
residential segregation fragments the urban landscape across education levels. Less 
educated workers are often located in regions where employment opportunities are 
scant, generating a spatial mismatch between their households and job-places. 
Moreover, the geographical representations of the patriarchal division of labor and 
gender norms accentuate the spatial mismatch penalties for less educated female 
workers, especially caregivers, limiting their access to labor markets. 
 
a. The spatial mismatch hypothesis 
 
The spatial mismatch hypothesis connects residential segregation to poor labor market 
outcomes. Its original proposition argued that segregation imposes spatial barriers to 
employment opportunities in the form of higher job-search costs. Additionally, by 
placing similarly educated workers in close proximity to each other, segregation 
                                                     
3 The focus on class rather than in race is due to the nature of the case study analyzed in subsequent 
sections. Santiago’s residential segregation, unlike most cities in the United States, has been primarily 




intensifies competition for local employment (Kain 1968; Fernandez and Su 2004; 
Gobillion et al. 2007).4  
The hypothesis emphasizes the role of distance to work and mobility in 
mediating the relationship between segregation and labor market outcomes. Highly 
mobile workers can mitigate spatial mismatch effects. However, not all individuals share 
similar capacities for mobility. Mobility is informed by our position within multiple social 
hierarchies, including gender.  
 
b. Engendering the spatial mismatch hypothesis 
 
Female labor market participation has increased significantly over the last decades. 
However, the masculinization of unpaid activities has proceeded at a much slower pace 
(Folbre 2021). The persistence of the patriarchal division of labor bears substantial 
consequences for women’s mobility. Unpaid activities are performed in a given place 
and at a particular time. Cooking meals, housework, and grocery shopping are all 
activities that, for the most part, cannot be performed from the job place. Moreover, 
activities like setting up the table for lunch, picking up the children from school, or going 
                                                     
4 The logic behind commuting and search costs effects is straightforward. People take into consideration 
the monetary cost of traveling to work; if this is too high, the net benefits from employment are lower 
(Zenou 2009). The spatial barriers to information have also been addressed through the significance of 
social networks for facilitating employment opportunities. The social composition of these networks is 
mediated by space.  One application of this notion contends that segregated residents tend to have 
‘strong-ties’ networks (close relations), with very few weak nodes (acquaintances). In close relations 
networks, information on job opportunities may be quickly flooded by the many close members of the 
network (Zenou 2013). 
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to PTA meetings occur at a particular location and at a specific time. These unpaid tasks 
penalize women’s participation in labor markets as they are often incompatible with the 
workplace and the working-day. Therefore, unpaid work constraints women’s mobility 
beyond monetary search-costs (Kwan 2000; Ta et al. 2016). 
 Domestic work’s spatial and temporal requirements strengthen the household’s 
gravitational pull on women’s mobility (Hanson and Pratt 1995, Duberley and Carrigan 
2013). Additionally, balancing paid and unpaid activities is seldom considered by public 
transportation authorities. This leads to a male-bias in transportation design, 
intensifying spatial mismatch effects (Loukaitou-Sideris 2016).  
 Mobility is also informed by gendered norms and expectations.  For example, the 
socialization of modern ideals around ‘responsible motherhood’ encompass 
employment location. Mothers who work far away from their children often feel 
anxious, irresponsible, and judged (Duberley and Carrigan 2013). Furthermore, 
commuting is a gendered experience. Male dominance over the public domain between 
the household and the job place frequently results in psychological and physical 
harassment. In this context, women’s mobility strategies entail avoiding specific places, 
or refraining from traveling during particular times of the day (Jiron 2007, Almahmood 
et al. 2017). 
 
c. Caregiving as a “coupling” constraint 
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Since caregiving often involves the participation of dependents with limited mobility, it 
is exceptionally restrictive to caregivers’ mobility. Additionally, dependents’ needs may 
not have a regular schedule. Some dependents may require help with asynchronous 
activities like using the bathroom, moving within the household, or stepping out on to 
the streets. Thus, caregivers frequently have to be “on-call” in close proximity to 
dependents. Caregiving, moreover, includes a great deal of supervisory work. 
 The combination of spatial and temporal constraints with such associative 
requirements are known as “coupling constraints” (Hägerstrand 1970). Feminist 
literature on economic geography has underscored care as one of the most restrictive 
coupling constraints to female labor market supply (Kwan 2000; Ta et al. 2016). Against 
the backdrop of a spatial mismatch, therefore, caregivers in segregated communities 
may be systematically excluded from the labor market.  
 
d. Occupational segregation and co-location of employment opportunities 
 
Thus far, in line with the original proposition of the spatial mismatch hypothesis, I have 
underscored supply-side constraints for female labor market participation. However, 
spatial constraints may also arise from labor demand. Prior works have qualified the 
spatial mismatch hypothesis by incorporating employers’ preferences and biases in 
hiring that segregate the labor market (Blumenberg 2004; Hellerstein et al. 2008).5   
                                                     
5 Certainly, occupational segregation also emerges from supply-side factors. Gendered self-selection into 
different jobs significantly contributes to the gendered segmentation of paid labor. 
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Stereotypes associating authority to masculinity contribute to the allocation of 
women to lower-paid and less secure jobs (Elson 1999). The image of glass ceilings is 
often invoked to characterize this form of occupational segregation. However, people 
also face glass walls when selling their labor power. The gendering of particular 
occupations allocates similarly skilled men and women to different jobs (Johnson and 
Crum-Cano 2011; Nasser 2018).6  
 Gender occupational segregation may also be reflected in a geographical division 
of job opportunities (Massey and McDowell 1984). Some industries tend to agglomerate 
in space to lessen transaction costs and take advantage of knowledge spillovers 
(Malmberg and Maskell 2002). A gendered co-location of employment opportunities 
would imply that “women’s jobs” are geographically separate from “men’s jobs.” 
Therefore, spatial barriers to employment may be gendered beyond mobility 
considerations. In an economically segregated city, paid domestic work may be an 
example of the co-location of gendered employment since more affluent households 
are more likely to hire domestic workers.  
 
e. Historical and political context of the spatial mismatch 
 
The empirical analysis of spatial mismatch effects on female labor market participation 
requires methodological qualifications. The residential organization of a city is the 
                                                     
6 Women are more likely to be hired in sectors involving care work, education, and tourism. Male-
dominated activities include economics, finance and the military. 
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outcome of place-specific political and historical processes (Brenner and Theodore 
2002). Additionally, gendered differences in mobility and employment accessibility vary 
across space and time (Massey and McDowell 1984). The centrality of segregation and 
mobility in determining spatial mismatch effects, thus, calls for an empirical examination 
that thoughtfully considers the context under which it takes place. 
 The inclusion of contextual elements in the empirical analysis is relevant for at 
least two additional reasons. First of all, from a quantitative analysis perspective, it is 
important to highlight the structural determination of low skilled workers’ residential 
location. If individual employment preferences are the main determinants of residential 
location, the econometric analysis would suffer from self-selection bias. Secondly, a 
contextual analysis of residential segregation unveils the systemic sources of labor 
market inequalities. 
 
IV. The social production of a spatial mismatch  
 
In magnitude, Santiago’s economic segregation is similar to the most racially segregated 
cities of the United States (Agostini et al. 2017). The city’s residential organization 
concentrates less educated (and low-income) workers in the southern and western 
banks of the city. In contrast, more affluent and higher-skilled households populate the 
northeastern quadrant of the city (see Figure 1). These regions, moreover, offer 
diametrically opposed conditions for mobility. While the wealthier areas connect to the 
city’s economic center through high-speed highways, 40% of affordable housing 
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residents—and 70% of slum-dwellers—have little to no access to public transportation 




Figure 1: The economic segregation of Santiago. Using the Generalized Neighborhood Sorting Index (Jargowky and 
Kim, 2005), I have decomposed Santiago’s residential segregation across the 2012 census tracts. Neighborhoods with 
above-average mean schooling are green (over 11.5), and neighborhoods that have below-average mean schooling 
are purple. The intensity of each color represents how much of the city’s overall segregation is explained by each 
neighborhood (in standard deviations). Thus, the more intense green/purple neighborhoods, the higher segregation 
levels for high/low skilled segregated neighborhoods. Source: 2012 Census. 
 Santiago’s residential distribution emerges from market-oriented reforms that 
trace back to the late 1970s.7 Back then, under the authoritarian rule of Augusto 
Pinochet (1973-1990), a combination of ideological, economic, and political factors set 
in motion the sorting of the city. The return of democratic governments in 1990 did not 
change this trajectory. In fact, Santiago’s segregation would peak several years into 
democratic rule (Agostini et al. 2017). 
                                                     
7 The transformation of the urban landscape due to market-oriented reforms is otherwise known as the 
neoliberalization of the city (Brenner and Theodore 2002) 
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 Pinochet’s policymaking style was well-known for its reliance on a reduced and 
selected crew of political and economic advisors (Silva 1996). Among these privileged 
voices, a group of Chicago trained economists were particularly relevant in restructuring 
the economic role of the Chilean state. These economists argued that the state’s 
intrusion in economic affairs fostered rent-seeking behavior (Krueger 1974), thus 
advocating for steep market deregulation and the privatization of publicly owned 
enterprises. The dogmatic character of the Chicago Boys’ economic agenda was, 
perhaps, best illustrated by the residential market reforms of 1979. 
 In that year, Neil Smith published an article underscoring that unregulated 
residential markets induce rent-seeking behavior among real estate entrepreneurs 
(Smith 1979). Yet, this did not bar the Chilean government from swiftly deregulating the 
residential sector by eliminating landholding and property-transaction taxes, as well as 
auctioning a significant share of state property. In line with Smith’s predictions, 
deregulation led to the spike of residential prices in regions with greater accessibility to 
Santiago’s economic center (Sabatini 2000; Garreton 2017). 
 Prior to Pinochet’s dictatorship, a significant number of informal settlements had 
spawned in these areas. Salvador Allende’s government (1970-1973) had promised not 
to evict settlers, leading many working-class families to occupy undeveloped lands in 
otherwise wealthy neighborhoods (Hidalgo et al. 2016). The deregulation of residential 
markets, however, turned these lands into profit opportunities for rent-seeking 
entrepreneurs (Sabatini 2000). Moreover, the slum-dwellers’ central role in the popular 
resistance to the dictatorship motivated the government to dissolve their communal 
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settings (Morales 1990). The complementarities between the rent-seekers’ economic 
interests and the dictatorship’s political interests, thus, facilitated the resettlement of 
nearly 165,000 people between 1979 and 1985 (Garreton 2017).8  
 Most families were relocated to the southern and western peripheries of the city 
(Morales 1990; Garreton 2017). At the time, these regions were scarcely populated, 
poorly connected to the rest of the city, and notably unfit to host large human 
settlements (Hidalgo 2007).9 This eviction process was instrumental in initiating 
Santiago’s segregationist trajectory. 
 The 1980 constitutional reform would transform the role of the state in the 
provision of affordable housing, consolidating the segregation process. Before the 
reform, the state was an active supplier of social housing. Thereafter, the state would 
assume a subsidiary role. Instead of publicly providing affordable housing, the state 
would subsidize individual families to participate in the private housing market. The 
state’s new role made private builders the de facto providers of affordable housing. 
Simultaneously, the government loosened restrictions for the construction of affordable 
housing projects. Among other reforms, it became permissible to build these projects in 
regions that were not fully urbanized (Hidalgo et al. 2016). 
 The new affordable housing market led private companies to cluster projects in 
the cheaper lands located west and south of the city’s center, furthering Santiago’s 
                                                     
8 According to the 1982 census, nearly 5% of people were relocated during this period. 
 
9 At the time of the evictions, the resettled regions presented poor to no access to clean water, poor 
access to electricity, and low levels of transportation connectivity to the rest of the city (Hidalgo 2007). 
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segregation (Sabatini and Brain 2008). Nevertheless, the urban poor faced significant 
barriers in accessing housing subsidies. Among its requirements, these subsidies 
required to demonstrate savings. Back then, however, very few low-income families had 
a bank account, let alone savings. These difficulties contributed to Santiago’s housing 
deficit reaching nearly 40% by 1989 (Garreton 2017).10 
   In 1990, when democracy was reinstated, the newly elected government of 
Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) promised to decrease Santiago’s housing deficit. They did so 
by loosening the requirements on housing subsidies and increasing government 
spending. By the year 2000, this policy managed to reduce the deficit to nearly 10%. 
However, the elected governments did not transform the role of the state and private 
companies in the provision of affordable housing. Thus, the market continued to 
allocate the urban poor to the southern and western banks of the city. Consequently, by 
2002, the city was significantly more segregated than it was in 1990 (Agostini et al. 
2017). 
Throughout the 21st century, the structural determinants of Santiago’s 
segregation have not changed much. Residential markets continue to lack government 
oversight. Additionally, the role of the state in subsidizing the demand for affordable 
housing has persisted up until the writing of this article. More recently, some initiatives 
at the municipal level have attempted to integrate some sectors of the city by building 
                                                     
10 The housing deficit in Chile is measured according to the number of families who share the same 
household with other families. 
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affordable housing in wealthy regions of the city. The magnitude of these initiatives, 
however, pales in comparison to the Santiago’s segregation levels.  
 
V. Methodological issues: Spatial autocorrelation and calculating the spatial 
mismatch 
 
Spatial mismatch calculations require the geographical coordinates of both households 
and job places. Additionally, in calculating the spatial mismatch effects on labor market 
participation, the definition of local markets is crucial. Here local markets are defined as 
all employment opportunities between the household and the average point of 
indifference between walking (or cycling) and taking a motored mean of transportation. 
Since not all individuals have access to the same means of motored transportation, 
individual local markets differ according to the ownership of private vehicles. Finally, 
given that gender occupational segregation may be spatially represented, individuals 
may not be able to access local gendered employment opportunities. In this section, I 
assess these issues and present the data used for subsequent econometric estimations. 
 
a. The Data 
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The primary dataset in this study’s empirical analysis is the 2012 Origin-Destination 
Survey (ODS) for the greater Santiago.11 The ODS provides coordinates for households 
and job places, as well as individual demographic and socio-economic data. 
Furthermore, this dataset has a large sample size at over 60,000 individual observations, 
including more than 23,000 employment locations.12 Even though labor market analysis 
is not among the survey’s primary objectives, the construction of individual survey 
weights considers employment and locational information that match the 2012 
census.13  
Additionally, the 2012 census is utilized for identification purposes. High omission 
rates in this census led to its repetition in 2017. However, omission rates were lower in 
Santiago (lower than 10%) and no systematic bias was found regarding socio-economic 
characteristics (Garreton et al. 2020). Therefore, at the very least, the 2012 census may 
be considered as a robust and reliable survey that accounts for over 90% of the city’s 
population.  
 
b. The spatial autocorrelation of female labor market participation 
 
The quantitative studies of Chilean female labor market participation mentioned in 
Section II share a relevant methodological oversight. They fail to address the spatial 
                                                     
11 Encuesta de Origen Destino, executed by the sub-Secretary of Transport in the Ministry of Transport 
and Telecommunications. 
12 Around 53,000 observations reside in the greater Santiago area. The dataset is representative to census 
zones, an area that is smaller than the municipal jurisdiction. 
 
13 See annex for comparison between weighted statistics in the ODS and the 2012 census. 
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autocorrelation of labor market participation. Spatial autocorrelation is the co-variation 
of some characteristics—in this case, labor market participation—within a geographical 
region. By itself, it is not a problem for econometric calculations. If geographical 
variations are captured by the model’s independent variables there shouldn’t exist any 
identification problems. However, if the model’s residuals continue to be spatially 
autocorrelated, then the model’s parameters may be inconsistent and/or biased.14 
 Table 1 shows the degree and significance of labor market participation’s spatial 
autocorrelation by gender and education level. Here, spatial autocorrelation is 
measured through Moran’s I, a global indicator of spatial association that ranges 
between negative-one and one, where zero indicates no clustering and one or negative 
one perfect clustering. If Moran’s I is statistically different from zero, then we can argue 
that labor market participation is spatially autocorrelated.15  
Table 1:  Labor market participation rate and spatial autocorrelation of LMP by gender and education level. Less 
educated is defined as having at most a high school degree, while more educated is defines ad having at least some 
years of tertiary education.  Source: 2012 ODS. 
  
                                                     
14 For an extensive discussion on these issues, see Gibbons, Overman and Pattacchini (2015), p. 124-136. 
 
15 See annex 2. for the mathematical expression of Moran’s I and how it was utilized in this article. 
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 The Table shows that spatial autocorrelation in labor market participation is 
especially acute among less educated women. While there are significant levels of 
spatial autocorrelation levels among less educated men, this does not include all men. 
The participation of those that reside with dependents, defined here as the caregiving 
population, does not co-variate with geography. The table also shows labor market 
participation rates in the ODS. Of all groups, women’s participation is the lowest and 
most geographically concentrated. 
  
c. Operationalizing the spatial mismatch through job density 
 
Following Hellerstein et al. (2008), I use job density as a local measurement of spatial 
mismatch. Job density is defined as the total number of job-places in a locality relative 
to the sum of working-age residents in the same area.16 The ODS, however, does not 
allow us to use this exact definition since the survey weights do not factor-in 
employment location. In fact, unweighted employment locations minimize the 
difference between relative municipal job availability between the ODS and the 2012 
census (See Table 2).17  
 
                                                     
16 People who are enrolled in schooling institutions are not considered as potential competitors for local 
employment opportunities. This is because these people may appear as non-participant, but they are not 
necessarily spatially constrained. 
 
17 The census offers employment location information only at the level of municipal jurisdiction. 
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Table 2: Relative municipal employment mean error between the 2012 ODS and the 2012 census. 
 
 
 Thus, job density calculations consider the (unweighted) standardized local job 
places over the (weighted) standardized local presence of working-age residents.18 
Highly segregated low-income regions presenting poor access to employment display 
job density values close to zero, while non-residential sectors that employ high amounts 
of people have a high hob density ratio.  
Localities are calculated as a radius around each individual household. To avoid 
issues of mechanic endogeneity, I deduct one unit from the total pool of local 
employment opportunities from the individual observations who work locally.19 
Considering these qualifications, the job density measurement for individual 𝑖𝑖 residing in 
the local area 𝐴𝐴 takes the following functional form: 
 
 
                                                     
18 Local competitors are defined below. 
 
19 On the left-hand side of the econometric equation (labor market participation) the observation would 
signal participation. Moreover, the local job that is held by the individual would marginally increase job 
density on the right-hand side of the equation. For every individual that is locally employed, this marginal 
increase in job density would always be associated with participation, thus leading to biases in the 
calculation of coefficients.  
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𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  
(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)







𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑗𝑗𝑜𝑜𝑗𝑗 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝐴𝐴, 
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �
1, 𝐼𝐼𝑜𝑜 𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑖 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 
𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝐴𝐴
0, 𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤 𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝐴𝐴. 
 
 Job density varies according to two exogenous assumptions. First of all, we need 
to define a locality radius. The larger the radius (i.e., the bigger the locality), the more 
homogeneous will job density be across households. Secondly, the numerator and 
denominator will vary with the assumed segmentation of the labor market. If, for 
example, we assume that all individuals can access all job places, then all job locations 
(numerator) and every working age individual (denominator) in the same locality are 
considered for the calculation of job density. On the other hand, if we assume 
segmentation in labor markets across education levels, then we would only consider the 
local job locations that hire individuals with similar schooling levels (numerator) and 
local residents with the same characteristic (denominator). Both of these assumptions 
are qualified in the following sub-sections.    
 
d. Defining local markets 
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Local boundaries must bear actual consequences on employment decisions. If not, 
Modifiable Areal Unit Problems (MAUP) may bias the analysis of spatial mismatch 
effects (Wong 2004).  The MAUP arises when using artificial boundaries to capture a 
geographical effect. It is a common problem in spatial mismatch analysis. For example, 
prior works often rely on census tracts to define local markets (e.g., Hellerstein et al. 
2008). Census tract boundaries, however, do not necessarily carry employment-search 
consequences for those who live within them.20 
For this article, locality thresholds are defined as the distance between the 
household and the average point of indifference between motored and non-motored 
travel (walking or cycling).21 Since not all individuals have access to the same means of 
motored transportation, the average point of indifference between motored and non-
motored travel differs according to car ownership. 
There are theoretical and empirical reasons to use this parameter. First of all, 
public transportation design does not consider the balancing of paid and unpaid 
activities, so employment opportunities which are not within walking distance may 
entail higher logistical costs for those conducting unpaid work (Loukaitou-Sideris 2016). 
Second, motored transportation involves higher economic search-costs than non-
                                                     
20 Imagine a household located in a mostly residential zip code area which is adjacent to a zip code area 
populated by multiple employment opportunities. Since the household’s zip code area is mostly 
residential, the calculated job density for that observation would be relatively low. This would not be a 
problem if the household was located in the middle of the zip code area. However, what would happen if 
the household was located at the edge of the zip code area nearing the business district? 
 




motored transportation.22 Finally, public transportation is also a gendered space and, as 
such, presents deterrent conditions for female travel. According to the 2019 National 
Survey of Urban Safety, Chilean women feared victimization significantly more than men 
while waiting for or while using public transportation.23  
I calculate this indifference point using the ODS. On average, people who own 
automobiles walk to their destinations when they are within a one-kilometer radius 
from their homes. On the other hand, those whose means of motored transportation 
are limited to carpooling or public services, on average, walk up to 1.4 kilometers from 
their place of residence before taking a motored mean of transportation.24 25 According 
to these thresholds, nearly 20% of employed people in Santiago work within their local 
boundaries. This is more likely for less educated workers, with 21.7% of them being 
locally employed. Among these, women are disproportionately represented. While 
18.4% of less educated men are locally employed, 27.1% of less educated women work 
within non-motored distance from their home.26  
 
e. Labor market segmentation and three models of job-density 
 
                                                     
22 In Santiago, the high costs of public transportation sparked national-level protests in October 2019. 
 
23 According to the National Survey on Urban Safety by the National Institute of Statistics (INE, for its 
acronym in Spanish). In Spanish, the survey is Encuesta Nacional Urbana de Seguridad Nacional (ENUSC).  
24 For adults between 18 and 65 years of age. 
 
25 For greater detail in how these averages were calculated, please refer to the annex. 
 
26 These numbers do not consider live-in domestic workers. 
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Not every local resident will qualify for the same job opportunities. Due to labor market 
segmentation, some jobs will only be available for people who meet particular criteria. 
Taking this into account, and for robustness purposes, three different job density 
models are listed below. 
 
i. Economic activity model 
 
In this model, labor market stratification is not a factor. It considers all working-age local 
residents (denominator) who are not enrolled in schooling institutions as potential 
competitors. Similarly, all employment positions held in the locality are considered as 
potential job opportunities (numerator), regardless of the skill and gender of individuals 
in these positions. The rationale behind this model is that overall economic activity may 
generate employment opportunities for all workers in the form of multiplier effects 
(Moretti 2010). In this model, every member of the household faces the same job 
density. 
 
ii. Education stratification model 
 
In this model, relevant local employment opportunities are held by workers in the same 
education bracket as the observed individual (numerator). Similarly, relevant local 
competitors share the same education level as the individual observation 
(denominator). Hence, less and more educated job densities are calculated for every 
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locality and ascribed to individuals according to their education level. The less educated 
job density measure includes people who hold at most a high-school degree while 
skilled job density comprises people having at least some college education. Individuals 
within the same household face the same job density only if they share education levels. 
 
iii. Education and gender stratification model 
 
Earlier, I argued that gendered occupational segregation in the labor market can entail 
different geographical landscapes for women’s and men’s work. This model seeks to 
capture these differences. While maintaining the distinction between less and more 
educated labor, this model also accounts for gender in the calculation of job densities. 
Therefore, individuals within the same household will face the same job density only if 
they share education level and gender. 
 Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for these three models. The most salient 
features in Table 3 are the outliers illustrated by the large discrepancy between job 
density at the 99th and 100th percentiles. The concentration of less educated 
employment opportunities in regions where few less educated workers reside partially 
explains these outliers. Nevertheless, they may also be a byproduct of the calculation of 
local boundaries.27 Hence, they must be addressed in the subsequent econometric 
analysis. 
                                                     
27 Even though the ODS considers a region larger than the greater Santiago area, some observations are 
located in peripheral localities of the dataset. This means that, for some localities, the observation of 
potential competitors may be censored leading to high job density values. Six observations were dropped 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for different models of job density using the 2012 ODS. 
 
 
f. Visualizing job density clusters 
 
Job density is a geographical variable that can help explain spatial autocorrelation in the 
labor market. If this is the case, we should expect for job density to be spatially 
autocorrelated as well. If our main thesis is correct, job density’s distribution should also 
reflect Santiago’s residential segregation.   
 Moran’s I is a global indicator. In other words, just a number that does not 
communicate the location of job density clusters. Therefore, I decompose Moran’s I into 
Local Indicators of Spatial Association (LISA). Following the literature, observations 
presenting statistically significant (p-values<0.01%) high measures of job density that 
neighbor other observations with high job density values are classified as part of a high-
High cluster (statistically high job density neighboring other statistically high values). 
Conversely, observations with low local measures of job density in proximity to other 
                                                     
due to not having any observations for the denominator. For example, in some localities there were no 
skilled female residents. 
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low-dense localities are assigned to a low-Low group (Anselin 1995). 28 29 Observations 
that do not meet any of these criteria are not clustered into any group, and thus are not 
depicted in the LISA maps.  
Figure 2 illustrates the LISA maps for less and more educated job density measures. 
On the top-left corner of the figure is the Moran’s I global statistic. Moran’s I confirms 
the clustering of job density in Santiago for both less and more educated workers. 
Moreover, as depicted by the red dots (each dot is a household), households in high-
High neighborhoods are mostly clustered in the downtown and northeastern regions of 
the city, where more affluent families reside. Blue dots represent clusters of low job 
density localities. The LISA maps illustrate how Santiago’s spatial mismatch is a 
reflection of the city’s residential segregation.  
                                                     
28 The mathematical expression for LISA can be found in annex 4. 
 
29 We could also find high-Low and low-High clusters. This would mean that a significantly job-dense 
locality neighbors significantly low-dense areas (high-Low), or that a significantly low-dense area Is 
surrounded by regions that are significantly dense. 
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Santiago’s northeast concentrates employment opportunities for less and more 
educated workers. There are very few low-Low clusters for less educated workers, and 
more noticeable amount for more educated workers. This means that there are very 
few employment opportunities for more skilled workers outside the northeast. This 
does not imply a spatial mismatch for more educated workers, since they mostly reside 
in the northeast. However, it does entail few economic incentives for these workers to 
move outside the northeast. 
 
VI. Spatial mismatch and female labor market participation 
 
Figure 2: Spatial autocorrelation for less and more educated job density using the 2012 ODS. Red dots represent employment 
positions located in regions concentrating significantly high levels of job opportunities. Blue dots represent employment 
positions located in regions presenting significantly low levels of job opportunities. The left panel shows employment positions 
that are held exclusively by less educated individuals (who hold at most a high school degree). The right panel represents 
employment positions held by more educated individuals. Source: 2012 ODS. 
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There are potential endogeneity problems when calculating spatial mismatch effects. 
Individuals may choose to live closer to employment opportunities if they have high 
preferences for participation. If this were the case, labor market preferences could 
contribute to Santiago’s segregation, making job density coefficients endogenous and 
possibly biased. Nevertheless, as outlined in section III, the urban poor’s residential 
location is born out of structural transformations rather than personal preferences. This 
is more evident when observing residential mobility patterns among less educated 
women.  
 
a. Endogeneity issues I: Residential mobility patterns 
 
While the ODS does not inform on residential mobility patterns, the 2012 census does. 
The census asks every citizen about their mothers’ birth location (unfortunately, not 
their fathers’). Therefore, we get can observe residential mobility patterns for female 
caregivers currently living with their children. Narrowing the data to working mothers 
we can examine mobility patterns for those who have revealed their preferences for 
labor market participation.    
In the census, job density is calculated at the municipal level. I group each of 
Santiago’s thirty-six municipalities into six groups (each comprising six municipalities) 
ranked from lowest to highest density. If caregivers with higher preferences for 
participating in the labor market were able to choose their residential location freely, a 
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significant flow of working women would move from low-dense areas to high-dense 
regions. However, this is not the case. 
 Over 83% of less educated working mothers born in the lowest-dense regions 
still live there. In fact, among all density groups, this one is the least mobile.  
Furthermore, those born in the highest-dense regions were the most mobile. Nearly 
45% of less educated working mothers born in high-dense regions moved away.  
Figure 3 depicts these mobility patterns. Here, Santiago’s segregationist 
development is most evident.  A small percentage of less educated women born into 
low dense groups moved into higher dense groups. Those born in higher dense areas 
moved into lower dense regions at a significantly larger rate. This evidence suggests that 
less educated women with preferences to work are not able to self-select into regions 
with high job density.
 
Figure 3: Fraction of less educated working mothers who moved away from their place of residence. The x-axis shows 
their new place of residence, in parenthesis is the average job density for each group. Source: 2012 census. 
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 Additionally, residential mobility patterns for less educated participant and non-
participant mothers are not significantly different from each other. Table 4 summarizes 
the percentage point differences between these two groups for all possible mobility 
combinations. A positive value entails that the percentage of labor market participants 
moving between density groups is higher than that of non-participants. For instance, the 
rate of labor market participants who were born in density group 1 but currently reside 
in density group 2 exceeds the rate for non-participants with the same mobility pattern 
by 0.8 percentage points. The diagonal bolded numbers represent percentage point 
differences between participant and non-participant mothers who did not move.  
Out of thirty-six possible combinations, thirty-four show no significant 
differences in residential mobility patterns. The two combinations that are significantly 
different in statistical terms (G1 to G4, and G1 to G6) are not economically significant. 
Only a very small fraction of the population born in the lowest density group moved to 
groups four and six (2% and 1%, respectively). These statistics reaffirm that labor market 
preferences are not a significant driving force in the residential location of less educated 
households. 
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Table 4:  Percentage point differences in residential mobility between less educated participant mothers and non-
participant mothers, t-test for significance levels (Census 2012). 
 
The scenario is slightly different for more educated workers (Figure 4). In this case, 
groups two and three are the most mobile (23% and 24%, respectively) and nearly 14% 
of more educated women born in group two now reside in the city’s densest region. 
This means that OLS coefficients for spatial mismatch effects for more educated female 
caregivers may be positively biased. Considering this endogeneity issue, our primary 
analysis is restricted to less educated caregivers.  
 
Figure 4: Fraction of skilled working mothers who moved away from their place of residence. The X-axis shows their 
new place of residence, in parenthesis is the average job density for each group. Source: 2012 census. 
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b. Endogeneity issues II: Individual and household characteristics do not 
predict job density 
 
If the identifying assumption is correct, and less educated caregivers are unable to sort 
into job-dense locations, individual and household characteristics should not predict job 
density.30 Table 5 shows that this is the case. Conditional on municipal fixed effects, OLS 
regressions show that individual and household characteristics are not significant 
predictors of job density, especially in the presence of dependents. 
Table 5: OLS regression for job density measures on individual and household characteristics for less educated women. 
These calculations consider municipal fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the municipal level. 
 
 
                                                     
30 I would like to acknowledge and appreciate the anonymous reviewer who pointed this out. 
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c. Econometric model 
 
In line with prior works on Chile, labor market participation is modeled as a function of 
individual and household level determinants (Larrañaga 2006, Contreras et al. 2011).31 
Additionally, two mobility variables are considered: the presence of a metro station 
within the observation's locality, and a dummy variable indicating if the individual holds 
a driver's license and owns a vehicle. Descriptive statistics for individual and household 
level regressors are summarized in Table 6.  
 
                                                     
31 At the individual level we control for: schooling, age (and age squared), total number of other adult 
women in the household (this variable may be relevant since the presence of other non-dependent adults 
may ease domestic and caregiving responsibilities, and thus facilitate labor market participation), total 
number of other adult males in the household, the log of the household’s income per capita discounting 
the observation’s personal income, physical conditions that might affect participation (pregnancy, 
cognitive and physical disabilities). At the household level we control for: number of children between 0 
and 3, 4 and 6, and, 7 and 14 years old separately; number of people who might need intensive care 
(cognitive and physical disabilities), and if there is a paid domestic worker in the household. 
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics (means, standard deviations in parentheses) for individual and household level 
regressors. 
 
The Table shows some relevant differences across education and gender in 
means for urban mobility. Women and men with access to higher education are more 
likely to hold a driver license than less educated individuals. Female caregivers, 
moreover, are the least likely to have one. Additionally, more educated households 
have more than one private vehicle on average, even as their access to the subway 
network is higher.  Less educated women, and especially caregivers, present the poorest 
conditions to travel across the city.  
Municipalities play a central role in the provision of public child and health care 
services. Thus, the calculations include municipal fixed effects to account for 
geographical differences in accessing these services. Finally, job density measures are 
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included to capture spatial mismatch effects. In line with Hellerstein et al. (2008), an 
interaction term between job density and schooling (in years) is included to capture 
differences in spatial mismatch effects across the education spectrum.32  
  
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑚𝑚 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾ℎ + 𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚 + 𝜃𝜃𝐽𝐽𝑜𝑜𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖ℎ
+ 𝛿𝛿(𝐽𝐽𝑜𝑜𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖ℎ ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑚𝑚 
 
Where 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖ℎ is a dummy variable equal to one if individual 𝑖𝑖 in household ℎ 
participates in the labor market, and zero otherwise. 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖, is a vector of individual 
variables, 𝛾𝛾ℎ is a vector of household variables, and 𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚 represents municipal 
level fixed effects.   
 To avoid endogeneiy issues, the primary sample for the analysis is restricted to 
less educated female caregivers 33 The model is calculated using OLS with standard 
errors clustered at the municipal level. For robustness purposes, the parameters of the 
model are recalculated after winsorizing job density measures by 1% and 5%.34 
Additionally, local job density is recalculated at double the walking-distance rate (2-
                                                     
32 The primary subset for analysis considers less educated caregivers. However, within the less educated 
group there is significant variation in schooling. Around 40% of less educated caregivers did not complete 
secondary education. 
 
33 Potential caregivers include adults who reside with children under 14 years of age and/or other adults 
who present severe mobility constraints. The ODS informs on people who face mobility constraints due to 
physical and cognitive disabilities. 
34 Winsorization is a mechanism for dealing with outliers that assigns less-extreme values to outliers. In 
this case, the observations that are in the first and last percentile of job density are assigned the values at 
1% and 99% respectively. 
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kilometer radius for drivers and 2.8-kilometer for non-drivers) to test if results hold up 
when easing locality assumptions. 
   As a secondary analysis, and for comparison purposes, the model is calculated 
for all less educated women and men, as well as for more educated caregivers. 
Additionally, we examine if local job density has an effect on less educated female and 
male caregivers’ access to formal and full-time employment.  
 
d. Results for less educated caregivers 
 
i. Spatial mismatch as a source of gender inequalities 
 
The spatial mismatch effects for less educated female caregivers are summarized in the 
left three columns of Table 8. For this group, all specifications of local job density are 
positive and statistically significant.  Furthermore, the interaction term between job 
density and schooling level is negative and statistically significant. Since schooling levels 
are, on average, higher than job density levels, this negative parameter entails than in 
places where job density is very low the net job density effect may be negative. In other 
words, when education levels are closer to complete secondary schooling, the likeliness 
of a caregiver participating in the labor market are significantly higher in job dense 
regions than in “job thin” localities. 
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Table 8: OLS estimations for working age less educated women and men residing with dependents and are not 
enrolled in any schooling institution. 
 
 The unequal job density distribution generates gender inequalities between 
women and men residing with dependents. The last three columns on Table 8 display 
the job density coefficients for male caregivers. None of these is statistically significant 
from zero. Furthermore, job density effects are significantly different between men and 
women (See Table 9). Residential segregation, therefore, accentuates the gender 
inequalities emerging from the patriarchal division of labor. 






ii. Analyzing the magnitude of job density effects across Santiago’s 
municipal jurisdictions 
 
Interaction effects, as well as the tall number of localities, complicate the analysis of the 
magnitude of spatial mismatch effects. Additionally, since the different job density 
models vary in value, we cannot simply compare coefficients to analyze the differences 
between these measurements.  
 To address these issues, we analyze net job density effects for a less educated 
female caregiver of average schooling (10.3 years) facing the average job density level 
for their respective municipal jurisdiction. Figure 5 net municipal job density effects, 




Figure 5: Municipal average job density effects over less educated women residing with dependents of average 
schooling. Outlined in red are the lowest net effects and in blue are the municipal jurisdictions with the highest net 
effects. 
 These maps once again reflect Santiago’s residential segregation. The southern 
and western regions of the city that concentrate the urban poor (especially La Pintana, 
Cerro Navia, Renca, and Pudahuel) have the lowest net effects. On the other hand, the 
city’s northeast (Santiago, Providencia, Vitacura, and Las Condes) concentrates the 
highest effects. In the economic activity model, the labor market participation of a less 
educated female caregiver of average schooling (and everything else equal) is 24% 
higher if she resides in the top 5 highest job dense municipalities vis-à-vis living in the 
top 5 less dense jurisdictions. The education stratification model and the education and 
gender stratification predict a 28% and 39% difference, respectively. 
 These differences in magnitude portray the interaction between occupational 
segregation and residential segregation. The regions that agglomerate wealthier 
households also provide gendered employment opportunities for less educated women, 
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especially in the form of domestic service. Thus, the ‘glass walls’ of the labor market 
may in fact influence Santiago’s spatial mismatch.  
 
iii. Spatial autocorrelation of residuals 
 
As outlined earlier, the spatial autocorrelation of labor market participation poses a 
potential problem for interpreting these results. If residuals continue to be spatially 
autocorrelated, then the model’s parameters may be biased and/or inconsistent. Table 
10 displays Moran tests for each model’s residuals, showing that these are not spatially 
autocorrelated and that they explain the spatial distribution of labor market 
participation. 
 
Table 10: Spatial autocorrelation for each of the models’ residuals. Moran's I was calculated using lm.morantest from 
the R package spdep (set seed 123). 
 
iv. Robustness I: Winsorization of job density measures. 
 
Earlier, we saw that there are significantly high outlying job density values. To ensure 
that these are not driving the results, the data is transformed through winsorization. 
This process assigns less-extreme values to observations with especially high and low 
values. Here, we winsorize the top and bottom 1% values, as well as the top and bottom 
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5%. Table 11 summarizes OLS results after winsorization, indicating that the parameters’ 
statistical significance holds after the transformation process.  
Table 11: Winsorized coefficients for less educated women and men residing with dependents. Municipal fixed effects 
are considered, and standard errors are clustered to the municipal level. 
 
 
v. Robustness II: Re-defining locality 
 
Table 12 shows the coefficients for the different job density models when defining 
localities at double the walking-distance rate. That is, 2,800 meters for individuals who 
do not have access to private vehicles and 2,000 meters for those that do. The results 
show that the education stratification model and the gender and education 
stratification model are robust to the widening of local job markets, confirming that 
occupational segregation in the labor market may play a significant role in determining 
spatial mismatch effects. 
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Table 12: Job density coefficients for localities defined at double the walking distance (2,000 mts for individuals who 
drive, and 2,800 for those that do not). 
 
 
e. Secondary analysis:  Access to high-quality jobs and spatial mismatch 
effects on other subpopulations 
 
i. Informality and full-time employment 
 
The spatial mismatch may also affect caregivers’ access to formal and full-time 
employment. Even though this question probably deserves an entire article, Tables 13 
and 14 show preliminary evidence for these effects.35 36 The results show that when 
men reside with dependents in job-thin regions, they are more likely to participate in 
                                                     
35 Informal job places are defined as the workplace of self-employed less educated workers. domestic 
workers (the law regulating domestic work in Chile did not come into place until 2014) and unpaid family 
workers. All other forms of employment are considered formal.  
 
36 The independent variables used for these regressions are the same as the ones used for predicting labor 
market participation. 
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the informal labor market and in part-time employment. For women, however, job 
density effects are not significantly different from zero. These results underscore the 
impoverishing effects of residential segregation on less educated caregiving families. 
While female caregivers are less likely to participate in the labor market due to the lack 
of available job opportunities, men are more likely to be employed in lower quality 
workplaces.   
 
Table 13: Job density coefficients for spatial mismatch effects on access to formal employment for less educated 
women and men residing with dependents. Regressions consider municipal fixed affects and standard errors are 




Table 14: Job density coefficients for spatial mismatch effects on access to full-time employment for less educated 
women and men residing with dependents. Regressions consider municipal fixed affects and standard errors are 




ii. Spatial mismatch effects on less educated non-caregivers and 
more educated caregivers 
 
Although our primary analysis focuses on less educated caregivers, it is worthwhile to 
show if residential segregation affects the labor market participation of other 
subpopulations. As argued above, unpaid domestic work can also be a source of 
mobility constraints at the same time as it is unevenly divided between men and 
women. Non-caregivers, therefore, may also be affected by spatial mismatch effects. 
Table 15 shows that this does not seem to be the case.  
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 Restricting the population to less educated women and men who do not reside 
with any dependents, we observe that job density effects are not significantly different 
from zero for either group. For women, however, the parameters do maintain the same 
direction as before.  
Table 15: Job density coefficients for spatial mismatch effects on labor market participation for less educated women 
and men who do not reside with dependents. Regressions consider municipal fixed affects and standard errors are 
clustered at the municipal level. 
 
 
 Even though this may be subject to self-selection problems, Table 16 shows that 
job density is not a significant determinant for more educated caregivers’ labor market 
participation. The negligible spatial mismatch effects illustrate the economic inequalities 
emerging from residential segregation. Spatial mismatch effects are reserved only for 
less educated households.  
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Table 16: Job density coefficients for spatial mismatch effects on access to formal employment for more educated 
women and men residing with dependents. Regressions consider municipal fixed affects and standard errors are 
clustered at the municipal level. 
 
 
VI. Final remarks 
 
This paper’s findings underscore the entrenched relationship between residential 
segregation and labor market inequalities. Cities themselves are a structural product 
and, as such, take on an intermediary role between the forces that produce them and 
the labor market. The uneven urban geography generates dissimilar conditions for labor 
market participation across different subpopulations. In Santiago, market-oriented 
reforms alongside mass evictions produced an economically segregated city that offers 
unfavorable conditions for the less educated female caregivers’ participation.  
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 The mobility restrictions emerging from unpaid care labor, in conjunction to the 
agglomeration of employment opportunities in wealthy neighborhoods, are behind the 
adverse effects of segregation on less educated women’s participation. The economic 
lives of women like Gabriela, who balance paid and unpaid responsibilities in areas with 
few employment opportunities, are a true testimony to our findings. 
Segregation reinforces the economic inequalities between low-income and 
affluent families. In households where female adults are unable to participate in the 
labor market, families fail to augment their earnings pool with additional income from 
female employment. Additionally, working men in these residences are more likely to 
participate in more precarious labor markets. Secondly, segregation may also contribute 
to inequalities within low-income (heterosexual) households. In these households, 
women’s economic dependence on male wages likely intensifies masculine control over 
females’ work and bodies.  
The scope of this article is limited to analyzing segregation’s unequal effects on 
labor market participation. However, future research should address the relevance of 
residential segregation on gender inequalities within paid work. The fact that less 
educated women’s labor market participation is disproportionately affected by 
segregation may be evidence of a more elastic labor supply at the level of the city. 
Nevertheless, at the local level mobility constraints could result in a more inelastic 
female labor supply when compared to men’s (Schmid 2016). In line with emerging 
literature on monopsonistic labor markets, a lower labor supply elasticity increases the 
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employer’s wage-setting powers (Card 2018). Thus, segregation could potentially be an 
explanatory factor for the gender wage gap.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE LIMITS TO CARE 
A POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS OF CHILE’S CARE SYSTEM AND ITS CRISIS 
 
I. Introduction 
Chile is aging rapidly. According to official estimates, nearly 30% of the working-age 
population (15+) will be 60 or more in 2035. Not only will Chile be the oldest country in 
Latin America, but it would have experienced one of the fastest demographic transitions 
in recent history (Villalobos Dintrans, 2018a). The pace of this transformation calls for a 
rapid understanding of its challenges. This article contributes to this endeavor by 
analyzing one of aging’s most serious byproducts: rising adult dependency levels. 
           Adult dependents are working-age people who need assistance with daily living 
activities. In other words, they need care. Is the Chilean care system prepared to meet 
the increments in the demand for care? This paper utilizes political economy analysis to 
answer this question. I find that emerging heterogeneity in household structures is 
significantly complicating the system’s ability to provide care. Furthermore, without 
structural reform, it is unlikely that adult dependents will receive the care they need. 
The Chilean care system interlocks several subsystems of care, including state-
provision, market-provision, and family-provision. The market and state subsystems, 
however, play a secondary role. The family is so essential to the Chilean care system 
that some have defined it as an unsupported familial regime of care (Martin, 2015; 
Palacios, 2016). 
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 The centrality of the family in the provision of care entails that the system rests 
on the unpaid labor of family members to provide care. By 2017, nearly 70% of them 
were women. 37 The system, therefore, rests upon a patriarchal division of labor that 
disproportionately allocates unpaid work to women (Folbre, 2021). Like any other 
division of labor, space limits the patriarchal division of labor (Smith 1937 [1776), Ch. III; 
Weber, 2019). In this case, the family-space. In this article, I examine the care system’s 
reliance on the patriarchal division of labor by calculating the significance of patriarchal 
limits in the overall provision of care. 
           Here, I identify two significant limits to the patriarchal division of labor: female 
presence and household size. Using OLS estimations and a large dataset from 2017, I 
show that dependents who reside in smaller households with less female presence are 
significantly less likely to receive any care whatsoever (even from secondary sources). 
My estimations show that dependents who reside with at least one non-dependent 
woman and one non-dependent man are more likely to receive care under the current 
system. On the other hand, adult dependents living without non-dependents are the 
least likely to receive any assistance. Considering that nearly 25% of adult dependents 
live in such conditions, this is a major cause for concern. 
           Additionally, my analysis shows that the proportion of dependents residing 
without non-dependents has increased significantly in the last decade, and it is likely to 
continue growing. Using Machine Learning (ML) prediction methods, I impute 
dependency levels to large surveys from 2006, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017. Until 
                                                     
37 According to the 2017 CASEN. 
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now, such detailed information on dependency levels existed only from 2015 onwards. 
The ML predictions show that the share of dependents living with at least one female 
non-dependent and one male non-dependent has decreased from more than 42% in 
2006 to less than 30% in 2017. The share of dependents residing without any non-
dependents has increased from 19% to 25% in the same period. 
           Population aging is likely behind this transition. Older adults are more likely to 
reside in smaller households than average dependents. As a more significant proportion 
of dependents has become older, their family structure distribution has converged to 
that of the elderly. In this context, the familial care system is less likely to provide the 
necessary care supply. Hence, a profound restructuring of the care system that removes 
the family from its center is necessary to avoid a crisis. 
           The article is structured as follows. Section II introduces the current state of adult 
dependency in Chile. Section III frames this article’s analysis in the literature of care 
crisis. Then, Section IV analyzes the political economy of adult care. Additionally, it 
analyzes the limits of the familial provision of care and how they affect the overall 
provision of care. Section V uses ML methods to analyze how dependents’ family 
structures have evolved in the last decade. Section VI concludes the article by discussing 
the implications of this paper on the restructuring of the care system.  
 
II. Adult dependency in Chile 
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Until recently, nationally representative surveys on adult dependency did not exist. In 
2015, Chile’s National Socioeconomic Characterization Survey (CASEN, for its acronym in 
Spanish) included adult dependence as a measurable variable for the first time.38 Here, 
we use the 2017 CASEN survey to capture the social distribution of adult dependency. 
This dataset consists of 216,439 observations. 
Adult dependency is defined according to individual capabilities for performing 
Basic Daily Activities (BDAs) and Instrumental Daily Activities (IDAs). BDAs include 
eating, bathing and grooming, moving within the household, using the bathroom, lying 
down or getting up from bed, and dressing. IDAs consider the capabilities to step out to 
the street, doing errands, doing housework, and making or receiving calls. 
Dependency levels are defined according to the dependent’s i) capability to 
perform an IDA or BDA, and ii) their need of assistance in performing an IDA or BDA 
(these are independent questions in the survey). Someone may present difficulties in 
performing an IDA or BDA, or they could completely lack the ability to do so. Similarly, 
someone could require help sometimes or always. Considering this, four dependency 
levels are defined in ascendant order: potential, mild, moderate, and severe. Table 7 
describes each of these: 
 
                                                     
38 http://observatorio.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/encuesta-casen 
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Table 7: Dependency levels according to functional capabilities. 
 
 
According to the 2017 CASEN, there are 993,630 adult dependents in Chile.  Over 
7% of the total adult population.  Age is a significant determinant of dependency. 
Almost 75% of adult dependents are 60 or more. A loss of functional abilities 
accompanies the natural decomposition of our bodies. Nearly 16% of adults between 60 
and 80 years of age are dependent to some degree. For adults over 80, the dependency 
rate exceeds 50%. Figure 6 illustrates the exponential relationship between age and 
dependency rates. The severity of dependency is also a function of age. Figure 7 shows 




Figure 6: Dependency rates by age. LOESS method used for smoothing. Source: CASEN 2017 
 
Figure 7: Dependency levels distribution by age. LOESS method used for smoothing. Source: CASEN 2017. 
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Age, however, is not the sole determinant of dependency. Socioeconomic factors 
also matter a great deal. For instance, income levels determine access to quality 
healthcare and healthy lifestyles. Strenuous physical work, vis-a-vis mental work, has 
been found to entail significantly higher levels of dependency in old age (Russo et al., 
2006). Participation in recreational activities, also correlated with earnings, substantially 
improves cognitive health in old age (Verghese et al., 2003; Ferreira et al., 2015). For 
these reasons, dependency rates are significantly higher in the lower echelons of the 
income distribution. Figure 8 depicts dependency rates for individuals with different 
schooling levels. There is an evident contraction in dependency at higher schooling 
levels.  This is especially true for people between 60 and 79 years of age, meaning that 




Figure 8: Dependency rates by age group and schooling. Source: CASEN 2017. 
Less-educated individuals are also poorer. Therefore, adult dependency rates are 
disproportionately high in low-income neighborhoods. The spatial distribution of adult 
dependency marks a crucial difference between the childcare and adult care systems. 
Table 8 shows the linear correlation between adult and child dependency rates and 
municipally averaged per capita income (in logs). Child dependency is defined here as 
children under 14, and dependency rates are the total population of dependents to total 
adults. A 1% increase in average income is associated with a 3.3% decrease in adult 




Table 8: Linear regression for adult and child dependency rates. Dependency rates are calculated as the fraction of 
dependents over the total adult population. 
 
 
 The CASEN survey offers another critical piece of information regarding the 
conditions of adult dependents: whether they receive assistance or not. Dependents can 
be cared for by household members (internal care), out-of-household individuals (paid 
and unpaid external care), or both. They can also not receive any care whatsoever. 
Figure 9 shows the distribution for each of these categories. Most dependents receive 
care exclusively from household members. Moreover, of the near one-million adult 
dependents in Chile, almost 30% do not receive any assistance. The considerable 
mismatch between the demand for care and its supply begs the question: is Chile 
undergoing a crisis in adult care? 
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Figure 9: Distribution of caregiving. Internal care is defined as care provided by household members. External care is 
defined as care provided by out-of-household individuals. 
  
III. Analytical framework: A crisis of care? 
 
Most countries have a formal definition for an economic crisis. Economic breaking 
points are clearly defined to capture the beginning and end of a crisis. They are tracked 
and measured. Care crises, in contrast, do not enjoy such treatment (even less for adult 
care crises). The measurement of care activities is, at best, preliminary. State officials 
have not seriously considered the definition of official care breaking points. 
Nevertheless, scholars and activists are paying increasing attention to the care crisis. 
Emma Dowling (2021) and others (Thorne, 2004; Himmelweit, 2007) define the 
care crisis as a simultaneous process that lowers access to care even as it raises the 
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barriers to provide it. Similarly, Beneria (2008) and Fraser (2017) argue that the collapse 
of specific social 
structures has constrained care provision, making it less available. These definitions 
depict the care crisis in quite a similar light to an economic crisis. During an economic 
crisis, the mode of production’s capability to produce is severely restricted. In a care 
crisis, the care system does not care enough. Both types of crises, moreover, are 
originated at the systemic level. 
The systemic nature of care crises underscores their complexity. Care systems 
have an intricate architecture of multiple interlocking and interdependent social 
structures (Folbre, 2021, p.10). Furthermore, social structures are composed of human 
relations that are, more often than not, based on hierarchies of contradictory interests. 
The hierarchical nature of these structures stabilizes them. Contradictory interests, on 
the other hand, are sources of instability. When people in the lower echelons of a given 
social structure gain power, the hierarchy loses its ability to stabilize the structure. If the 
social structure is fundamental to the system’s inner workings, then the whole system 
might be destabilized and enter into crisis. 
The interlocking and interdependent nature of social structures adds another layer of 
complexity to care crises. The normal functioning of one social structure may create 
instability in another. Once again, this is similar to an economic crisis. Extensive 
scholarship describes how the institutional arrangements that regulate social life, 
the mode of regulation, periodically tensions the essential hierarchies in the capitalist 
mode of production (Boyer, 1990; Aglietta, 1998). This is true even as regulation and 
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production can complement each other. Similarly, the interlocking structures that 
compose the care system may simultaneously complement and contradict each other 
(Folbre, 2021). Changing conditions transform the balance between contradictory and 
stabilizing forces. Systemic crises occur when the system is unable to adapt to these 
changes (Ibid.). 
     The complexity of care crises can be periodized into an ongoing cycle of different 
moments (Archer, 1995). The first moment is that of structural conditioning. Caregivers, 
non-caregivers, and dependents find themselves in a network of pre-existing social 
structures. Then, there is a moment of social interaction. Here, agents and pre-existing 
structures interact to condition a third moment: social elaboration. At this third 
moment, individual and collective agencies can either reproduce or transform the pre-
existing social structures, thus creating new structural conditions.  
          This article’s analysis of the adult care crisis examines these moments in an 
inductive manner. We start by analyzing the current structural conditions to care. Then, 
we contextualize the current conditions as part of an ongoing process of structural 
elaboration. By examining the evolution of structural changes in the care system over 
the past decade, we can identify if the system’s care provision has become weaker or 
stronger. This process of structural elaboration sheds light on the system’s abilities to 
meet increments in the demand for care and its capacity to overcome a care crisis. 
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IV. Structural conditions to care: The political economy of adult care and its 
limits 
 
The care system is composed of interlocking subsystems of care. There are at least three 
subsystems of care in Chile: state-provided care, market-provided care, and family-
provided care. Each of these subsystems presupposes a particular division of labor, 
which allocates care work and distributes costs. However, divisions of labor have limits 
that affect the subsystem’s care supply. Hence, the capability of each subsystem to 
provide care informs the overall capacity of the system to supply care. This section will 
analyze each of these subsystems and their limits, emphasizing the familial subsystem of 
care. 
           Limits to the division of labor are an essential component of care supply. Limited 
space for expanding the division of care labor reduces the likelihood of the subsystem’s 
care supply to meet rising care demand. The fundamental emergent property of the 
division of labor is that it allows for specialization. Individuals will carry out more 
specialized tasks as the division of labor is deeper, increasing social productivity (Weber, 
2019). Conversely, a restricted division of labor incentives individuals towards 
diversification. Since combining care provision with other economic activities is difficult 
(Kwan, 2000; Loukaitou-Sideris, 2016), limited space for the division of labor will hardly 
be conducive to increasing the care supply. A reduction in the space for the division of 






a. Abstract social space, not just markets, limit the division of labor 
 
The division of labor is a system of exchange. This led Adam Smith to famously claim 
that the size of the market limits the division of labor (Smith 1937 [1776), Ch. III). 
However, what is the market?  Smith certainly did not mean that an actual concrete 
market would limit the division of labor. Instead, he speaks of an abstract place in our 
common imaginary, socially enforced by norms, institutions, regulations, and supply and 
demand. The forces that expand or contract the limits of the market-space are exclusive 
to this particular configuration. Divisions of labor can also take place outside this space. 
 For instance, an explicit chain of command structures the division of labor within 
most capitalist firms. Even though exchange exists within the firm, demand and supply 
mechanisms do not determine the firm-level division of labor limits (Simon, 1991). 
Rather, it expands or contracts according to the decisions of those at the top of the 
hierarchy.  
Command mechanisms are present in other spaces as well, with varying qualities. 
The division of labor within the state, for instance, is the composite of multiple 
interdependent and inter-scalar chains of command at different scales. Existing 
institutions (e.g., the executive branch, democracy) and territorial boundaries establish 
its limits (Jessop, 2016). Within the family, patriarchal systems have historically 
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commanded the division of labor. Biological and social reproduction limit the size of the 
household division of labor (Folbre, 2021).  
 The multiple spaces under which the division of labor takes place calls for a 
qualification of Smith’s comment. It is abstract space, not markets, that limit the division 
of labor. We can find at least three of these spaces within the care system: the state, the 
market, and the family. The division of labor, and its limits, are particular to these 
places. Moreover, these limits also stamp the relevance of each subsystem within the 
overall care system. Abstract sites that are severely restricted will provide less care (i.e., 
secondary subsystems). On the other hand, more relevant to the system are places 
where the division of labor has provided ample supply of care  (I.e., primary 
subsystems). A crisis in the care system, therefore, is more likely to originate in primary 
subsystems. 
 
b. The neoliberal state and its limits 
 
Since the 1980s, when a handful of military men controlled the state, three principles 
characterize Chile’s welfare system: austerity, subsidiarity, and focalization (Valdivia 
Ortiz de Zarate, 2015). These are the pillars of the so-called neoliberal state. The 
principle of austerity portrays a ‘fiscally responsible’ state that significantly cuts down 
on discretionary expenditure.39 Even though austerity is a common practice in 
                                                     
39 The long-lasting characteristics of austerity in relation to the temporary nature of crises signals for some 
authors that austerity is inherently ideological (Jessop 2016, p.236). 
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neoliberal economies, Chile’s fiscal spending is amongst the most restricted. Among 
OECD countries, Chile ranks second to last in public social expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP (11.4%).40   
           Fiscal spending is especially low in adult care (Palacios, 2016; Villalobos Dintrans, 
2018b). Chile’s most comprehensive adult care program is the Assistance and Care 
National Sub-system (ACNS),41 implemented under the government of Michelle 
Bachelet (2012-2016). This program offers assistance to dependents and their caregivers 
by providing resources, information, and networks to facilitate home care. The ACNS, 
however, only covers 21 of the 345 municipal jurisdictions in the country. In 2017, the 
program served 937 adult dependents. That is 0.1% of adult dependents.42 
           The state also provides long-term care services, home care services, and day 
centers for elderly dependents. In line with focalization principles, these services are 
rigorously targeted. Benefactors must be elderly (60+) citizens in the poorest 60% of the 
population, abandoned or not receiving family care, and presenting at least moderate 
dependency levels. Together, these programs serve almost 3.400 dependent adults 
(0.35% of adult dependents). Public spending in ACNS plus these three caregiving 
services cost the state 0.004% of the country’s GDP.   
                                                     
40 https://www.oecd.org/centrodemexico/medios/gasto-publico-social-ocde.htm 
 
41 Sub-sistema Nacional de Apoyos y Cuidados (https://www.chilecuida.gob.cl/). 
 




           Finally, the state also offers subsidies43 to municipalities and NGOs to provide 
long-term care services to low-income older adults with moderate to severe 
dependency. These subsidies actually represent the state’s highest-spending account in 
adult care. In 2017, these subsidies benefited 5.634 adult dependents. These subsidies 
accounted for over 47% of the state’s total spending in care provisioning.  
The pillars of neoliberalism limit the expansion of the state’s care supply. The 
neoliberal ideal of a ‘small’ state is perhaps the clearest in adult care. In total, the state 
only provides care to about 10,000 people or 1% of adult dependents. Today, the 
number of dependents who do not receive any assistance exceeds the state’s supply by 
almost thirty times. The more than forty years of neoliberal rule have assigned the state 
to a secondary role in the care system.  
  
c. The limits to the care market  
 
Here, we will consider the market provision of care in its broadest possible sense. Any 
form of commodified care, including paid domestic workers, is regarded as a part of the 
market. Under this definition, the limits of the market could be ample. Global care 
chains, for example, cut across international borders to cover the demand for care in 
one place by contracting care somewhere else (Hochschild, 2014). Demand for 
commodified care is crucial for the expansion of the market. In Chile, even though 
nearly 30% of dependents do not receive care, market demand is low. Less than 8% of 
                                                     
43 Fondo Subsidio ELEAM. 
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adult dependents access the care market.44 The fact that adult dependents are 
disproportionately poor is most likely behind this fact. 
The care market is overrepresented by the wealthy. Although 9% of adult 
dependents are in the top quintile of the income distribution, 30% of dependents with 
access to the market belong to this group. The hiring of live-in domestic workers 
partially explains this overrepresentation. 42% of live-in domestic workers caring for 
adult dependents work in top quintile households. However, these workers only 
represent 7.7% of the care market.45 
Unequal access to the care market is reflected in out-of-home care as well. The 
economic segregation of Chilean cities has facilitated long-term care providers to cluster 
in wealthy neighborhoods (Villalobos Dintrans, 2018a). Private medical services, 
moreover, are virtually inaccessible for adult dependents. The unregulated private 
health insurance market (ISAPRES) crowds out adult dependents by heavily raising their 
premiums (Villalobos Dintrans 2018b). Hence, the state ensures 96% of the adult 
dependent population (FONASA).46  
In Chile, economic inequality and high poverty rates among adult dependents limit 
the market provision of care. Rising dependency rates will likely increment the market's 
care supply. However, in an unequal country like Chile, the market will probably 
continue to target wealthy individuals. The focalization of state- and market-provided 
                                                     
44 According to the 2017 CASEN. 
45 According to the 2017 CASEN. 
 
46 In contrast, less than 85% of the national population is publicly insured. 
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care entails that the family and unpaid female caregivers are at the heart of the Chilean 
care system. 
 
d. The primary subsystem of care: The family 
 
According to the 2017 CASEN, household members care for 56.7% of adult dependents. 
Considering that 29% of dependents do not receive any assistance, almost 80% of 
assisted dependents are cared for by family members. The care system strongly relies 
on family caregivers, especially women. Hence, scholars have labeled the Chilean adult 
care system as an unsupported familial regime of care (Palacios, 2016).  
 A patriarchal system structures the division of care labor in most families. This 
system ensures an ample supply of unpaid care through the exploitation of women 
(Folbre, 2021).47 However, it also structures care shortages. Here we analyze the basic 
structure of the patriarchal care supply and its influence on the overall provision of care. 
As we will see, the limits to the patriarchal division of labor severely affect the system’s 
care supply. 
 
i. The patriarchal family structure and caregiving 
 
                                                     
47 Exploitation can be defined beyond the productive sphere. Nancy Folbre (2021) defines it as an unfair 
division of gains and costs.   
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Most classical economists dismissed the social character of the household division of 
labor.48 Marx, for example, argued that the household division of labor was a product of 
nature rather than exchange (Marx 1990 [1867], p. 471-3). Smith was even less 
attentive, arguing that the division of labor was limited to the space of the market 
(Smith 1937 [1776), Ch. III). This omission is more than a couple of centuries old. 
Aristotle, for instance, argued that masculine rationality was the natural source of 
patriarchal rule over slaves and women.49 What is perhaps more surprising is that this 
rationale persisted long after the works of classical economists. Neoclassical economists 
have defended the patriarchal division of labor on very similar grounds to Aristotle. 
According to them, its efficiency relied on the altruistic nature of male household heads 
(Becker, 1985). Their models explicitly assume that “men know best.”  
However, as feminist scholars have pointed out, the patriarchal division of labor 
is neither natural nor efficient. Patriarchal structures are systems of collective power 
that privilege mature heterosexual men over others (Folbre, 2021, p. 21). In household 
care, patriarchal structures enable men to enjoy the benefits of care without bearing 
the brunt of its costs. The patriarchal order, moreover, is not sustained on the altruistic 
or rational nature of men but by a complex ensemble of political, cultural, and economic 
forces (Ibid.). 
Two kinds of power regulate patriarchal systems: bargaining power and 
normative power. Bargaining power represents the political, legal, and economic 
                                                     
48 For a rigorous review, see (Folbre, 2009). 
49 Aristotle, Politics, Book I, Part V (http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.1.one.html). 
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entitlements that an individual can wield to influence (care) labor allocation. 
Additionally, since a division of labor is an inter-dependent social structure, bargaining 
power is also determined by each household member’s fallback positions or exit 
strategies (Folbre, 2021). On the other hand, normative power emerges from shared 
imaginaries and expectations around gender and work (Agarwal, 1997). 
Women “doing gender” often implies caring for family members. The 
pervasiveness of gender norms explains why the distribution of unpaid work has 
remained asymmetrical even as women have entered the labor force (Bittman et al. 
2003; Beneria et al. 2015, p.60).50 Normative power affects the division of labor 
differently than bargaining power. Gender norms are internalized. Therefore, to meet 
gender expectations, women may supply more care than men even if they do not live 
under the same roof. In other words, normative power entails that the patriarchal 
system does not necessarily need a live-in patriarch to enforce it.  The historically 
gendered character of bargaining and normative power has ensured women’s provision 
of unpaid care. Hence, female presence is crucial to ensure the patriarchal care supply.  
In addition to female presence, household size also matters. The patriarchal care 
supply relies on female exploitation. Since care is a public good, women assume 
caregiving costs while not ripping most of its benefits (Folbre, 2021).  This is an internal 
contradiction within the patriarchal system: caregiving can impoverish caregivers. In 
larger households, however, this contradiction is partially alleviated. More sizeable 
                                                     
50 In Chile, scholars have attributed Chile’s particularly low female labor market participation to the 
prevalence of gender norms (Contreras et al., 2010). 
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homes provide more space for the division of labor and, therefore, more space for 
specialization. In turn, the specialization of some (male) household members in paid 
employment allows for income-pooling, leveling the material conditions of paid and 
unpaid workers. Income-pooling, then, characterizes the exchange element within the 
patriarchal division of labor. Without it, the internal contradictions of patriarchal 
systems become more apparent, rendering them unstable. Hence, household size also 
conditions the patriarchal care supply.  
The factors that condition patriarchal supply provide evidence for the familial 
subsystem’s reliance on patriarchal systems. Table 9 shows that households without 
female presence and/or smaller in size are less likely to internalize care provision. The 
table divides dependents’ families into four different types: dependents residing with i) 
at least one non-dependent woman and one non-dependent man (32% of dependents 
live in this families), ii) at least one non-dependent woman and zero non-dependent 
men (22%), iii) at least one non-dependent man and zero non-dependent women (22%), 
and iv) zero non-dependent adults (24%). 
 
Table 9: Household type distribution for adult dependents. The table summarizes average household size (according to 





The conditions for the patriarchal division of labor are more fertile in households 
with at least one non-dependent woman and one non-dependent man. These 
households are larger in size and have a female presence. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that almost 80% of dependents residing in these households receive care from a family 
member. In more than 80% of these cases, that family member is female. Dependents 
who live with at least one non-dependent woman and zero non-dependent men 
configure smaller residencies that retain a female presence. These households 
internalize care at a slightly lower rate to that of larger configurations with male 
presence. The normative character of caregiving may be more evident when we 
compare these households with their counterparts: households with at least one non-
dependent man and no women. Although similar in size, these households internalize 
care at a significantly lower rate (72% versus 56%). Households without any non-
dependents, moreover, are the least likely to internalize care (16%). 
Table 9 confirms the strict reliance of the familial subsystem of care on the 
patriarchal exploitation of women. When the conditions for it are not ripe, the 
subsystem’s care supply decreases. Patriarchal systems, therefore, simultaneously 
ensure and limit the provision of care. The primary role of family care within the care 
system underscores the relevance of patriarchal limits for the current system to close 
the gaps in care.   
 
e. Who doesn’t receive care? 
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Under the current structural configuration, who doesn’t receive care? Using the 2017 
CASEN survey, we can calculate if the structural limits to the different subsystems of 
care determine who does and who doesn’t receive assistance. Nearly 30% of 
dependents do not receive care. As one might expect, individuals with lower levels of 
dependency are less likely to receive assistance. Figure 10 shows the percentage of 




Figure 10: Percentage of dependents receiving care according to dependency levels. 
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45% of potentially dependent adults and 70% of mild dependents receive care. Most 
moderate and severely dependent adults receive some form of care (90% and 98%, 
respectively). Lack of assistance at the early stages of dependency can bring about 
serious public health concerns. Without proper care, individuals with low dependence 
levels may continue to lose functional abilities and accelerate severe dependency (Metz, 
2000; Golinowska & Sowa, 2017).     
  The Chilean system of care is characterized by its inadequate provision of 
preventive care services (Palacios, 2016; Villalobos, 2018a). However, how much of this 
omission is owed to the familial subsystem of care? So far, we have seen that the 
Chilean care system is extremely reliant on family care. Different family types, 
moreover, internalize care responsibilities at different rates. Smaller and more 
masculinized households supply less care than larger households with a female 
presence. Hence, dependent adults residing in households with low care supply may be 
more likely to not receive any kind of care.  
 I test this hypothesis using the 2017 CASEN and OLS methods. The dependent 
variable takes the value of zero if the dependent adult does not receive any assistance 
and one if they do. Moreover, I use two population subsets. First of all, I calculate the 
determinants of being cared for for all adult dependents (12,660 individuals). Then, I 
limit the dataset to potential and moderate dependents (6,974). 
 I calculate two models for each population subset. Model 1 groups dependents 
into four family types, which are then used as categorical regressors. These categories 
are: dependents living with i) at least one non-dependent female and one non-
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dependent male, ii) at least one non-dependent woman and zero non-dependent men, 
iii) at least one non-dependent male and zero non-dependent females, and iv) with zero 
non-dependents. Model 2 considers the total of non-dependent women and non-
dependent men as determinants for being cared for. This model captures the effects of 
household size on the likelihood of receiving care.  
 Both models also consider a series of household and individual determinants. 
These include the total number of children younger than 14 in the household, the 
household income per capita, dependency level, the dependent’s gender, age, and 
schooling. The outcomes for each model are presented in Table 10: 
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Table 10: OLS regression output for all dependent adults and potential and mild dependents using the 2017 CASEN. 
Estimations were calculated using survey weights. 
 
  
The regressions show that dependents living in family types that are less fertile 
for the patriarchal division of labor are significantly less prone to receive any care at all. 
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The difference between families with male and female non-dependents and households 
with only female non-dependents is the least significant. This result underscores the 
reliance of the Chilean care system on unpaid female labor. Moreover, dependents that 
only reside with male non-dependents are significantly less likely to receive care. 
Dependents residing without any non-dependent adults are the least likely to receive 
care. These results mimic the internalization rates for each household type presented in 
Table 9. Model 2 shows that family size matters for receiving care. The presence of non-
dependent women and non-dependent men increases the likelihood of receiving care. 
However, the effects are higher for non-dependent women.51 Model 2 further 
underscores the reliance of the system on unpaid female labor. Moreover, the effects 
are different for potential and mild dependents than for the average population. People 
at early stages of dependency are less likely to receive care if they reside in smaller 
households or without the presence of male and female non-dependents.52  
 When we analyze the remaining variables, we find some interesting results. 
Controlling for family types, the number of children in the household is not a significant 
determinant for receiving care. This is surprising since it has been observed elsewhere 
that children often help with taking care of dependent adults (Folbre, 2021). Moreover, 
household income per capita and the dependent’s schooling level present an inverted-U 
relation with the likelihood of receiving care. This is in line with the political economy of 
                                                     
51 T-tests for the differences between the effects of non-dependent women and non-dependent men are 
significant to 1% for all dependents, and 5% for mild and potential dependents.   
 
52 Statistical tests for these differences can be found in the annex (Section A.1). 
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the Chilean care system. The state targets the poorest households, while the market is 
hyper-focalized on the wealthiest families. However, income and education effects are 
very small.  
  The structural limits to the provision of care are significant predictors for 
receiving care. Therefore, the current structural conditions of the care system help 
explain the gap between the demand for adult care and its supply. However, has the 
care system always experienced these conditions? In the next section, we examine the 
last decade of structural elaboration. Our findings show that the structural environment 
has become increasingly adverse for the current system to provide care.  
 
V. How did we get here and where are we going? Trajectories in adult 
dependent family structures and the structural elaboration of a care crisis 
 
The limits to the patriarchal division of labor play a significant role in reducing the 
system’s care provision. Hence, shrinking limits to the patriarchal division of labor would 
signal a loss in the system’s capability to provide care. Our analysis here shows that this 
is the case. Moreover, if this trajectory continues, it is unlikely for the current care 
system to meet increments in demand. A care crisis may then be forming on the 






a. The shrinking of Chilean family structures: Internal and external factors  
 
Instability in social systems may arise from internal contradictions and external factors 
(Folbre, 2021). The exploitative nature of patriarchal systems is a source of internal 
instability. Exploited groups (i.e., women) are more likely to contest existing structures 
when they gain collective power. Conversely, external factors may obstruct the 
exploitation of women. The demographic transition, and its effects on the structural 
conditions of the care system, are most likely a result of both internal and external 
factors. 
 Household-size reduction is expected in growing economies. However, in Chile, it 
has been strikingly fast. Since the turn of the century, Chilean households have reduced 
from an average of 3.6 members to 3.1.53 To contextualize, in the United States, the 
average household size was 3.6 in 1970, and it is yet to reach 3.1.54 The fast reduction of 
Chilean homes has been associated with declining fertility and marriage rates (Salinas 
2011). In turn, the internal weakening of patriarchal structures partially explains these 
declining rates. 
 In terms of bargaining power, women have made important strides over the last 
couple of decades. For instance, Before the COVID-19 pandemic hit, women had 
                                                     
53 From 3.6 in 2002 to 3.1 in 2017, according to the census (https://www.censo2017.cl/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/presentacion_de_la_segunda_entrega_de_resultados_censo2017.pdf). 
 
54  https://www.statista.com/statistics/183657/average-size-of-a-family-in-the-us/ 
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significantly increased their labor market participation. In 2000, 36.5% of working-age 
participated in the labor market.55 This number rose to 48.9% by 2017. Additionally, 
there have been considerable improvements in family law. In 2004, Chile was the last 
country to legalize divorce, decreasing male power over women’s bodies (Salinas, 2016). 
Reproductive contraception has also become more widely available in the past 20 years. 
For example, since 2013, all public health institutions are obligated to stock and 
distribute the “morning-after” pill. 
 However, as other authors have pointed out, the explanatory power of internal 
factors needs to be nuanced (Salinas, 2016; Ramm, 2016). First of all, gender norms 
continue to be an essential factor in allocating unpaid work, especially in lower-income 
households. Research has shown that “traditional” values that associate women to 
unpaid work have weakened among the younger and more educated people but remain 
strong among older and less educated individuals (Contreras & Plaza, 2010; Gómez-
Urrutia et al., 2017). Since low-income and elderly homes have higher adult dependency 
rates, it is less likely to observe the transgression of gender norms in such spaces. 
Moreover, the masculinization of unpaid care provision has been much slower than the 
feminization of paid employment. Alejandra Ramm (2016) observes that women are still 
more likely to take on the lion’s share of unpaid childcare responsibilities (Ramm, 2016). 
Our analysis shows a very similar trend for adult dependents. When there are non-





dependent women in the household, the likelihood of them becoming the primary 
caregiver exceeds 80%. 
 The limits to the internal explanation have led scholars to look for explanations 
to the demographic transition in external factors. In Chile, women born in wealthy 
households) are significantly more likely to marry than those born in lower-income 
homes. Therefore, lower-income women are far more likely to be born into single-
mother or non-married couples’ households, further decreasing their likelihood of 
marrying (Salinas, 2011). Persistent economic inequality has reproduced and deepened 
this pattern over time, as lower-income households are increasingly conformed around 
more unstable structures (cohabitation) or become smaller (Ibid., Ramm & Salinas, 
2019). Since dependents tend to be from lower-income backgrounds, external economic 
factors may be reducing their household size. 
 Have dependent households reduced in size? The literature has paid little 
attention to this question. The lack of reliable data on adult dependency may be behind 
this omission. The Chilean authorities began to measure adult dependency in the CASEN 
only in 2015. Therefore, until now, we have not had reliable information on the 
evolution of families with adult dependents. 
 




Over 90% of dependents in 2017 are disabled people. However, less than half of the 
adult disabled population is dependent (42%). Analyzing the family distribution of 
disabled individuals may not provide an accurate depiction of the actual distribution of 
adult dependents. Similarly, as presented above and elsewhere (Villalobos Dintrans, 
2018a), age is not the sole determinant of dependency. Hence, examining the family 
composition of the elderly may also lead to a misguided analysis of the condition and 
evolution of dependent family structures. Figure 11 compares the actual family 
distribution of adult dependents in 2015 and 2017 to that of the elderly (75+) and 
disabled adults. 
 Disabled people are more likely to live in large households, while the elderly 
usually live in smaller households. As we can see, people with disabilities are 
significantly more likely to reside with at least one non-disabled woman and one or 
more non-disabled men than dependents. Conversely, elderly individuals are more likely 
to reside without any other non-elderly adults than any other group. The actual 
distribution of adult dependents lies somewhere in between the distribution of the 




Figure 11: The family type distribution of dependents, disabled people, elderly people, and elderly disabled individuals 
in 2015 and 2017. 
 
 The distributional differences between elderly and disabled populations pose a 
challenge for analyzing the trajectories of the care system’s capability to meet 
increments in demand. If disability drives dependency rates, the distributional pressures 
towards larger families may facilitate the familial system’s care provision. On the other 
hand, if the aging population is pushing dependency levels, then the system may be 
entering a crisis. 
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 As an initial approach, we can statistically compare the family distribution of 
dependents to that of old age, disability, and a combination of both. Paerson’s Chi-
squared and the Log likelihood ratio are two commonly used goodness of fit tests in the 
analysis of categorical data distribution. The null hypothesis for both tests is that the 
distribution of dependent family structures equals the distribution of disabled or elderly 
peoples’ family structures. Tables 11 and 12 summarize the outcomes of the tests for 
each distribution in 2015 and 2017, respectively. None of these groups accurately 
represents dependency. The family distributions of disabled people, however, do have 
lower coefficients. This means that their distribution is closest to that of dependents. 
Interestingly, the coefficients for elderly distribution decreases from 2017 to 2015, and 
those for families with disabled members increases. 
 
Table 11: Goodness-of-fit tests comparing the actual distribution of dependents to that of the elderly, disabled people, 




Table 12: Goodness-of-fit tests comparing the actual distribution of dependents to that of the elderly, disabled people, 
and elderly disabled in 2017. Survey weights were included in the calculations. 
 
c. Using machine learning to predict dependency since 2006 
 
Since dependent’s family structures cannot be proxied through disability or age, I turn 
to Machine Learning. Machine learning is nothing more than different statistical and 
probabilistic techniques that optimize prediction. Its use has gotten particular attention 
in the medical community, where observers have noted that machine learning 
significantly improves our capacities to predict different medical conditions (Cruz & 
Wishart 2006; Weng et al. 2017; Blomberg et al. 2019). To my knowledge, there have 
not been any attempts to predict dependency using these techniques. 
Overfitting is one of the most significant issues when using machine learning 
methods (Foster, Kropowski & Skufca, 2014). For this reason, we must consider a series 
of precautions. First, the dataset used for training the predictive model must be 
sufficiently large relative to the number of predicted categories. Here, we pooled 
individual data from the 2015 and 2017 CASEN surveys (212,730 and 175,076 
observations, respectively) for predicting only two categories: non-dependency and 
dependency.56 After dropping the observations that do not possess complete 
                                                     
56 Dependency includes potentially dependent individuals. 
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information, we are left with 374,513 observations. The predictors were chosen 
according to a range of medical and socio-economic variables. All CASEN surveys since 
2006 share these.57  
For validation purposes, I randomly sample the pool data into a training and a 
testing dataset.58 The training dataset consists of 187,769 observations (50,1% of total 
observations) and the testing dataset is comprised of 187,769 observations (49.9%). I 
use six different algorithms to predict dependency and then choose the superior 
combination of precision and accuracy. In the annex, you can find an explanation for 
each algorithm (Section A.2). Also, you will find the methodology for choosing the 
Random Forest algorithm as the most appropriate for our analysis. The annex also 
presents Paerson’s Chi-Squared tests showing that the model accurately predicts the 
distribution of dependents’ family structures (Section A.4). Having chosen the 
appropriate predicting model, I predict adult dependency for six different CASEN 
surveys between 2006 and 2017. 
 
d. Adult dependency since 2006 
 
The predictions show a clear increment in dependency rates over the past decade (Table 
13). In 2006, a little over 4.5% of adults were dependents. This number rose to 7.4% in 
                                                     
57 Hence, I will predict dependency for the years 2006, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017. The 2003 
CASEN has very similar medical data with differences in the periodization of the data. 2003 was not 
considered due to this reason. The list of predictors can be found in the annex, Section A.3. 
58 Using set seed (12345) in R. 
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just eleven years. In the same period, the fraction of adults over 60 years of age 
increased significantly. In 2006, according to estimates from the National Institute of 
Statistics59, people over 60 represented 15.9% of adults. The same estimates show that 
this number rose to 20.2% in 2017. The simultaneous increments in dependency rates 
and older population are not a coincidence. 
 
Table 13: Predicted dependency rates since 2006. 
 
 
 Figure 12 shows the predicted distribution of dependents according to age 
bracket between 2006 to 2017. Here, dependents between 15 and 59 years of age fall 
under the category of younger dependents. In eleven years, older dependents have 
increased their share by almost 10%. This more than doubles the increment in the share 
of 60+ individuals over the total adult population. Furthermore, by 2035 the fraction of 
60+ adults will graze 30%. The dramatic increase in the older population will most likely 
entail a similarly momentous increment in dependency levels.    
 
 
                                                     
59 Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas (INE), https://www.ine.cl/ . 
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Figure 12: Growth in the share of older (60+) dependents between 2006 and 2017. 
 
e. Changes in dependents’ family structures since 2006: A crisis in the 
horizon 
 
As dependents become increasingly older, their family structures change as well. Older 
people are more likely than the disabled population to reside in small households. The 
predictions show a convergence in the household structure distribution of dependents 
and older adults. Figure 13 depicts this convergence since 2006. That year, more than 
42% of dependents resided with at least one non-dependent woman and one non-
dependent man. The rate of dependents in these households has continuously 
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decreased to around 30% in 2017. Moreover, dependents living without non-
dependents have increased from under 20% to around 25%. The rate of dependents 
residing with one non-dependent man has slightly increased as well. 
 




Figure 14: Average number of non-dependents residing with dependents according to machine learning predictions. 
 
 The trajectories presented in Figures 13 and 14 reflect a severe obstacle for the 
familial subsystem of care. As dependents’ families become increasingly smaller, the 
likelihood of receiving unpaid care decreases. In other words, the shrinking limits of the 
family-space are increasingly complicating providing adequate care under the current 
system. Female presence, moreover, has not counteracted household shrinkage (Figure 
14). Therefore, both essential elements to the patriarchal division of labor are 
increasingly missing. By insisting on the female unpaid provision of care, the system is 
trading women and ghosts. 
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 The shrinkage of dependents’ household size is ubiquitous across the income 
distribution. However, it is especially dramatic in lower-income homes. Figure 15 shows 
the average magnitude of non-dependent adults in households with at least one 
dependent by income quintile. Households in the poorest 20% of the population (or first 
quintile) have continuously decreased in size from having an average of nearly 1.9 non-
dependent adults to less than 1.3 in 2017. This represents the most significant decrease 
among all income groups. Since dependency rates are higher in the lower echelon of the 
income distribution, household reduction in this group places additional concerns on 





Figure 15: Average number of non-dependents residing with dependents by income quintile according to machine 
learning predictions. 
. 
 The predictions show that dependent households have followed a similar trend 
to the overall structure of Chilean family structures. Hence, the change in dependent 
family structures may also respond to internal and external structural pressures. More 
research is necessary to elucidate if this is the case. However, what is certain is that the 
emergent configuration of dependents’ households is increasingly challenging the 
patriarchal division of labor. As the share of older dependents grows, the observed 
trajectory is likely to continue. This would further weaken the current care system. 





VI. Final remarks: New spaces for care 
 
Chile’s care system has historically relied on unpaid family caregivers (i.e., women) to 
meet the demands in adult care. The demographic transition, however, is a challenge 
that the system is unlikely to overcome. This article analyzes the current configuration 
of the care system through a political economy lens, showing that the system is not only 
exploitative but unsustainable as well. Machine learning predictions show that 
dependency rates are rising even as dependents increasingly reside without non-
dependent family members. Through econometric analysis, moreover, this paper has 
shown that the patriarchal system that structures the familial provision of care fails to 
provide for dependents under these family conditions. Hence, for the Chilean care 
system to overcome the demographic challenge, it must undergo a profound structural 
transformation. 
           First of all, the family should no longer be at the center of the system. The 
shrinkage of the family complicates a division of labor capable of providing care. 
Moreover, the incentives for non-dependents to diversify rather than specialize in care 
are higher in these smaller settings (Weber 2019). Our findings show that trajectories 
dependent family structures have mimicked that of the overall population. Internal and 
external structural elements have shrunk the limits to the patriarchal division of labor. 
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As this continues to happen, the familial system will increasingly lose its ability to 
provide care. 
           Moreover, in the context of extreme economic inequality, the market is seldom 
an option for care. The few long-term care services that exist in Chile tend to focalize on 
higher-income dependents. Adult dependency, however, is more common in lower-
income communities. Only when presented with state subsidies, the market provided 
care for this population (Villalobos Dintrans 2018b). It is also worth noting that 
international experience tells us that the market also penalizes caregivers (Folbre, 
2018). Therefore, a market-centered approach may not be appropriate to meet the 
increments in the demand for adult care. 
           A new political accord regarding the role of the state in care may be needed to 
overcome the challenges of the demographic transition. It would undoubtedly require 
higher fiscal spending. However, most importantly, it would require the state to create 
an appropriate space for the division of care labor. The dangers in defining this new 
abstract space are plenty. The state, unlike the market, has fewer self-regulatory 
mechanisms to increase or decrease the size of the division of labor. Therefore, a hyper-
centralized structure in the provision of care may result in an elongated and over-
bureaucratized space. Such a space may result in the inefficient use of public revenue. 
On the other extreme, if the provision of the state is too localized, the limits to the 
division of labor may prevent it from effectively meeting the increments in demand (as 
is the case for families today). The challenge of the impending crisis of care is, therefore, 
to find a middle ground.
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CHAPTER 3  





Dependency rates among Chilean adults will skyrocket in the upcoming decades 
(Villalobos DIntrans, 2018). However, the familial care system that has characterized 
Chile since its inception is unlikely to meet the current demand for adult care (Garcia 
Dellacasa, 2021, Ch. II). Without reform, increased levels of dependency will 
undoubtedly entail an economic toll, especially for those who currently bear the brunt 
of caregiving costs: women. This article analyzes the economic and gender implications 
of a reform seeking to replace the familial care system with a community-based care 
system. 
 In particular, I analyze the impact of institutionalizing Community Care 
Aides (CCA) at the heart of the care system. CCAs are home and out-of-home care aides 
that assist and accompany adult dependents in their communities. Furthermore, CCAs 
are (paid) municipal employees. The program, hence, redistributes the costs of caring 
from the family to the state. However, there are other economic implications to such a 
program. 
 In Canada and the United States, the evolving role of health care aides has 
significantly increased the sector’s efficiency (Berta et al., 2013; Quinn et al., 2016). 
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Moreover, a recent study showed that investing in home care aides would significantly 
boost aggregate demand in the United States (Palladino, 2021). This economic boost is 
likely to be paired with inequality reduction. The home care aide position does not 
usually require tertiary education. Therefore, lower-income individuals will 
disproportionately benefit from the program.     
 Here, I examine the economic benefits of the CCA through a theoretical lens. 
This article uses neoclassical economic analysis to evaluate the program’s theoretical 
repercussions on economic growth and inequality reduction. These parameters are 
particularly relevant for Chile. In 2019, millions took the streets to protest against 
neoliberal policies that produced economic growth at the cost of deepening and 
reproducing staggering inequalities. Then the Covid-19 pandemic hit and, in one year, 
GDP fell by almost 6%. Today, the country necessitates inclusive economic policies that 
can boost growth while simultaneously decreasing inequality. 
 In this paper, I present a consumption-leisure-caring model to analyze the 
impact of the CCA and two other programs: a Universal Basic Income (UBI) and a stipend 
for domestic workers. Using baseline data, the simulations of the model show that the 
CCA outperforms the other policies in both boosting the economy and reducing 
inequality. The program will create a disproportionate amount of employment 
opportunities in economically depressed regions, increasing consumption levels among 
lower-income households. Moreover, the program will allow thousands of caregivers, 
especially women, to increase their labor supply by trading away several hours of 
unpaid work. The increment in consumption and aggregate demand, together with the 
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expansion of labor supply, help disperse the inflationary pressures often associated with 
fiscal spending. 
 However, the success of the program is not guaranteed. Trust is essential to the 
economic prospects of the CCA. If families do not trust the care of their loved ones on 
community caregivers, the benefits of the program dissipate. In this article, I examine 
the potential impact of the CCA in three different scenarios—low, medium, and high 
trust environments. The analysis shows that trust conditions the program’s potential to 
boost growth and decrease economic and gender inequality. Trust, therefore, is a risk 
factor that needs addressing in the design and implementation of the CCA.   
 The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, I present the main characteristics 
of the CCA program. Then, in Section III, we discuss the theoretical framework used for 
our analysis, underscoring the role of temporal and spatial constraints on caregivers’ 
labor supply. Section IV introduces a leisure-consumption-caring model with gendered 
expectations and exogenous residential location for individual maximizers. This model 
does not consider family-decision making processes (a later section addresses this 
shortcoming). Section V analyzes the CCA program through the model’s lens, showing 
that the CCA will simultaneously increase local job density and decrease the domestic 
provision of care (conditioned on trust), boosting consumption and labor supply. 
 Then, in section VI, we review alternative policies through our model. Section VII 
offers a simplified parametric version of the model presented in Section IV comparing 
the effects of the CCA on economic growth, inequality, and the distribution of domestic 
care with those emerging from the UBI and paying domestic caregivers. We show that 
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the potential economic benefits of the CCA exceed those of the alternative policies. 
Section VIII introduces a theoretical extension to our individual-maximization model 
that includes family-decision making processes through a Cournot-Nash non-
cooperative equilibrium analysis. This model shows that the CCA can potentially help 
achieve a balanced distribution of unpaid domestic care in heterosexual extended 
households. 
 
II. Community Care Aides Program 
 
By 2035, nearly 20% of Chilean adults will be 65 or older.60 One of the challenges arising 
from a rapid demographic transition is the higher need for adult care and its 
implications for the economy. Today, nearly 30% of adult dependents do not receive 
any assistance.61 Elsewhere, I have observed that a critical component in Chile’s lack of 
adult care supply is the system’s over-reliance on family care. As families have become 
smaller, their ability to cover the incremental demands for care has dwindled (Garcia 
Dellacasa 2021, Ch. II). Restructuring the care system is required to meet the challenges 
of the demographic transition. 
 The Community Care Aides (CCA) program is an alternative to restructure Chile’s 
care system. At a structural level, the CCA does two things. First, it reallocates the role 
                                                     
60 According to estimates from the National Statistics Institute (INE, for its acronym in Spanish).  
 
61 According to the 2017 CASEN survey, Chile’s largest publicly available dataset. 
 104 
of primary adult caregiving provider from family members (i.e., women) to the 
community. The CCA is a universal caring service where adult dependents receive care 
from people in their communities, providing respite to their family members. Secondly, 
the CCA reassigns the costs of caregiving from families to the state. Community 
caregivers are not volunteers. They are state agents employed by local municipal health 
clinics (CESFAMs or CECOFs.) Hence, they are paid for their work with tax money. 
 The program seeks to increase the coverage of adult care by addressing one of 
the current system’s most salient shortcomings. The increasing number of dependent 
adults residing in small households has rendered the familial system unsuitable for 
providing care (Garcia Dellacasa, 2021; Ch. II). The CCA program incentivizes people to 
provide care for their neighbors even when they reside alone. Moreover, the CCA may 
also generate efficiency gains for the health sector by preventing increments in 
dependency levels. People who receive care at early stages of dependency are less likely 
to worsen their condition (Thomas and Blanchard, 2009). 
 Trust is essential for the CCA to succeed. If people are unwilling to participate in 
the program, unpaid family members will continue to provide care. The community 
aspect of the program is crucial for trust-building. People tend to trust more in those 
more similar to them and have had more extended social interaction (Alesina & La 
Ferrara, 2002; Freitag & Traunmuller, 2009). However, experience is also crucial to trust 
(Ibid.). Therefore, the CCA must provide a quality service for which training caregivers is 
necessary. Since CCAs are nested in the Public Health system, they are required to go 
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through formal training.62 This way, the CCA program seeks to professionalize care 
provision while building trust in its services. 
 A crucial component of the CCA is that it improves the working conditions of 
caregivers. First and foremost, caregivers are paid for their work. Although this requires 
further research, elsewhere, I have proposed a sliding-scale payment based on 
employment flexibility.63 Severely dependent adults require full-time supervision and 
assistance. Caregivers assisting them would earn 1.5 minimum wages.64 Moderate 
dependents may not require full-time assistance, but they do need periodical visits. 
Part-time CCAs caring for moderate dependents would receive one minimum wage. 
Finally, moderate and potentially dependent adults may require help with occasional 
and sporadic activities. Sporadic CCAs would make 75% of the monthly minimum 
wage.65 
 The program would also improve caregivers working conditions in other ways. 
Caring alone, as is the case in most families, increases the subjective workload 
associated with caring (Sandoval et al., 2019). Caregivers who participate in social 
networks (like the church, for example) consistently have better mental health (Ibid., 
                                                     
62  This should not increase the cost of the CCA too much. Fortunately, the training for community care 
aides already exists in Chilean health centers This is because the figure of the community caregiver is 




64 In Chile, the minimum wage is established on a monthly basis. 
 
65 Under Chilean labor law, someone who works less than full-time is entitled to receive the direct fraction 
of the minimum wage corresponding to their workday. For instance, if someone works 50% of a full-time 
position (45 hours per week), they would be entitled to 50% of the minimum wage. 
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Villalobos Dintrans, 2019). The CCA program seeks to institutionalize these networks 
through regular meetings between caregivers and municipal authorities.  
 The CCA, therefore, has the potential of closing the adult care gap while 
simultaneously improving the conditions of those who care. However, this comes at a 
high cost for taxpayers. This is why it is essential to underscore the additional economic 
implications of the CCA program. In what follows, I will examine some of these 
implications in the context of Chile. A country where most of its population resides in 
economically segregated cities (Garreton et al., 2020). 
 
III. Caring in segregated cities 
 
In Chile, employment opportunities cluster in regions far away from lower-income 
neighborhoods. This spatial mismatch is especially problematic for the labor market 
participation of female caregivers who face the highest penalties for mobility (Garcia 
Dellacasa, 2021, Ch. I). Moreover, dependency rates are disproportionately high in low-
income communities, further restricting female labor market participation (Garcia 
Dellacasa, 2021, Ch. II). 
The coinciding problems of residential segregation and unequal dependency 
rates present us with a unique opportunity for inclusive development. The CCA program 
would create jobs in communities where employment opportunities are scant. 
Additionally, it would allow families to externalize care provision, effectively removing 
one of the most critical barriers to less educated women’s participation in the labor 
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market. To understand the effects effects of the CCA on growth and inequality, we must 
intengrate the spatial context of caregiving under the familial system of care. 
 
a. Temporal constraints on female labor supply 
 
The patriarchal division of labor disproportionately allocates unpaid domestic and care 
responsibilities to women. Whether it is due to lower bargaining power or enforcement 
of traditional gender roles, women continue to undertake most unpaid responsibilities 
(Folbre, 2021). Among these responsibilities, unpaid domestic care is particularly 
restrictive to labor market participation. In fact, in Chile, female caregivers spend 
around double the time on unpaid responsibilities than non-caregiving women.66  
Some neoclassical theorists have underscored care’s temporal constraints as a 
crucial component of women’s labor supply (Carmichael and Charles, 1998; Heitmueller, 
2007). In their models, informal caregiving affects labor supply in a contradictory 
manner. Since time is finite, and most jobs do not offer completely flexible working 
days, unpaid responsibilities increase the opportunity cost of labor market participation, 
contracting labor supply through substitution effects. On the other hand, dependents 
cannot always sustain themselves economically. Therefore, caregiving responsibilities 
may also entail income effects that expand labor supply. If substitution effects are 
higher than income effects, then informal care reduces labor market supply. If, on the 
                                                     
66 According to the 2015 National Time Use Survey (ENUT 2015, for its acronym in Spanish), female 
caregivers spend 7.3 hours per day in unpaid work versus 4 for non-caregivers.  
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contrary, income effects exceed substitution effects, informal care would increment 
labor supply.  
 
b. Spatial constraints to labor supply 
 
If the temporal competition of paid and unpaid work determines substitution effects, 
then commuting times also affect labor supply. Therefore, women facing long 
commuting times present a more constrained labor supply. In economic geography, the 
geographical penalization to labor market outcomes is known as spatial mismatch 
effects, a theory that underscores the role of mobility and distance to work in 
determining labor supply (Kain, 1968; Kain, 2004).  
  In Chile and elsewhere, scholars have outlined that women face additional 
obstacles when moving across the urban space (Jirón, 2007; Almahmood et al., 2017). 
For example, male harassment often leads women to different strategies for urban 
mobility and labor market participation. Night jobs, for instance, may be out of 
consideration for women who reside in dangerous neighborhoods and rely on public 
transportation (Jirón, 2007). However, unpaid domestic and care labor is probably the 
most limiting factor to female mobility. 
 First of all, public transportation is not designed to balance paid and unpaid 
responsibilities, complicating the combination of these activities (Loukaitou-Sideris, 
2016). Additionally, unpaid care involves the participation of dependents whose 
mobility is often limited. Care work pairs place-bound and people-bound constraints. In 
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other words, care needs to take place somewhere (at some time) with someone, further 
complicating labor market participation.67 68 
  
c. Residential segregation and female labor supply 
 
The spatial considerations for labor supply present a possible source of endogeneity in 
balancing paid and unpaid work. If people can self-select (a-la-Tiebout)69 into regions 
were employment opportunities are widely available, then spatial and temporal 
constraints may not be a significant factor in determining the labor supply. 
Consequently, determining the exogeneity of residential location on employment 
decisions is a considerable challenge for spatial mismatch research (Hellerstein et al., 
2008). 
 More often than not, however, residential segregation is the product of 
exogenous political and economic events that penalize the urban poor’s locational 
capabilities (Nightingale, 2012, Rothstein, 2017). Extensive research has unveiled the 
political events that have led Chilean cities to become some of the most economically 
segregated in Latin America (Sabatini, 2000; Hidalgo, 2007; Sabatini and Brain, 2008; 
                                                     
67 This is known as a coupling constraint (Hägerstrand, 1970) and is one of caregivers’ most restrictive 
factors to mobility (Kwan, 2000; Ta et al., 2016). 
 
68 In terms of female labor supply, gendered mobility entails that substitution effects will grow faster for 
women than for men. Moreover, if we consider coupling constraints, substitution effects will likely grow 
the fastest for caregivers. Assuming that income effects will not drastically vary with distance, growing 
substitution effects entail that female labor supply will become less elastic with commuting distance and, 
eventually, negatively sloped until the point of not entering or dropping out of the labor force. 
 
69 In 1956, Charles Tiebout developed a theory of public goods where urban residents were able to locate 
their households according to their public goods preferences (Tiebout 1956). 
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Agostini et al., 2016; Garreton, 2017; Garreton et al., 2020). In my work, I have provided 
evidence for the inability of less-educated female caregivers to locate their households 
in regions with high availability of employment opportunities in Santiago, the country’s 
capital and most populous city (Garcia Dellacasa, 2021, Ch. I). 
 Regularly, the economic segregation of urban space coincides with the sorting of 
the city across educational levels (Diamond 2016). The attractiveness of urban amenities 
attracts more educated and affluent households to particular sections of a city, 
increasing housing prices and effectively displacing or excluding lower income people 
from these regions. These areas, moreover, tend to be around the economic centers of 
the city, where employment opportunities are more widely available (Garcia Dellacasa, 
2021, Ch. I). 
 Considering gendered mobility constraints, the sorting of urban spaces across 
educational levels further penalizes female labor market participation, especially for 
less-educated caregivers. This entails additional considerations for inclusive 
development strategies. In order to be successful, policies seeking to increase female 
labor market participation and reduce economic inequalities must seriously consider the 
locational characteristics of job creation.  
 
IV. A simple model 
 
I use a leisure-consumption-caring model to analyze the economic implications of the 
CCA program. In order to contextualize the CCA in Chilean cities, the model considers 
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exogenous household location and gendered expectations. Moreover, in this initial 
setup, the model assumes that women and men residing with dependents make 
decisions independently. This is a strong assumption. After all, families do coordinate 
their division of work.  I relax this assumption in a later section. 
           The model’s initial setup bridges two bodies of theoretical literature. It considers 
both the temporal constraints of care and residential segregation for defining labor 
supply. The caring aspects of the model reflect the works of Carmichael and Charles 
(1998) and Fevang, Kverndokk, and Roed (2009). Similarly to these models, we assume 
that men and women have altruistic preferences for family dependents. However, we 
also consider that women can internalize social expectations that associate femininity 
with caregiving (i.e., gender norms).  
           Gender norms have sustained, and have been reinforced by, several centuries of 
patriarchal rule (Folbre, 2021). Scholars have observed that even when women enter 
the labor force, they take on the lion’s share of domestic care responsibilities to live up 
to social expectations (Bittman et al., 2003; Beneria, 2010). Social narratives of ‘good 
working mothers’—women who balance paid and unpaid responsibilities—have become 
increasingly prevalent (Duberley and Carrigan, 2016). On the other hand, ‘Good working 
fathers’ narratives are much less present in the social imaginary (Ranson, 2012). Chile’s 
low female labor market participation in lower-income households, moreover, has been 
associated with prevalent gender norms (Contreras & Plaza, 2010). 
           Regarding adult care, gender norms are perhaps the clearest in households where 
dependents reside with single non-dependent adults (Garcia Dellacasa, 2021; Ch. II). The 
 112 
likelihood of adult dependents residing with single women or single men is similar. In 
2017, around 22% of dependents lived with single women and 22% with single men. 
Nevertheless, single women provide care at a significantly higher rate than single men. 
Almost 72% of dependents residing with single women receive care from them. On the 
other hand, less than 57% of dependents living with single men receive care from their 
family members. 
           Previous works theorizing spatial effects on labor supply have focused on mobility 
constraints (Gutierrez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren, 2010). The model presented here 
integrates residential segregation in this form. As mentioned earlier, residential 
segregation is associated with a spatial mismatch between home and job place. The 
regions that host lower-income segregated communities are often economically 
depressed and, therefore, lack employment opportunities. Hence, people in segregated 
communities are less likely to be employed locally and travel longer distances to find 
employment. The effects of residential segregation on mobility constraints can be 
operationalized through the relationship between job density and commuting time. 
           Job density is the relative availability of employment places to working-age 
residents in a given locality. Following Garcia Dellacasa (2021, Ch. I), this model assumes 
that local job density is exogenous to labor supply decisions. The 2012 Origin 
Destination Survey for the greater Santiago region shows the relationship between job 
density and commuting time. Defining job density similarly to Garcia Dellacasa (2021, 
Ch. I), Table 14 summarizes this linear relationship for less-educated full-time workers 
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on a typical workday.70 The dependent variable is the ratio of commuting time over 
total hours spent at the job place (i.e., the commuting share).71 Table 14 shows that a 
unit of job density decreases the commuting share by over 5% for public transportation 
users.   
 
Table 14: OLS regression for less-educated workers in a typical day using 2012 ODS. 
 
 
a. The basic setup: Utility maximization under gendered expectations 
 
Considering gender norms; and decision-making as independent from other non-
dependent adults; our model assumes that non-dependent women and men residing 




                                                     
70 Less educated workers are those that at most hold a high school degree. 
 
71 According to the ODS, the commuting share is 25.7% for workers using public transportation and 15.1% 
for people who travel using private means of transportation. 
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Where X represents the bundle of goods and services consumed by the individual and 
bought in the market, and L illustrates the number of hours spent on leisure activities. 
Following Fevang et al. (2009), A denotes an altruistic function informed by the 
dependent’s wellbeing (N), and β  is the individual valuation of the dependent’s care 
status (β > 0). Hence, A is positively correlated with N. S, on the other hand, is a function 
denoting the gendered expectations to provide care. Its negative coefficient is 
interpreted here as a psychological penalty for not meeting gendered expectations. 
Therefore, as dependents have their needs met, the gendered penalty decreases. In 
other words, S is inversely related to total care received by the dependent (N). γ  is its 
respective discount factor (γ > 0). 





Where 𝑍𝑍 is the total amount of informal care received from household members and ?̅?𝑍 
is the total hours of care received from out-of-household individuals. η is a discount 
factor associated with the degree of trust in out-of-household care (0 < 𝜂𝜂 < 1). As 
mentioned above, people may be less trusting in non-familiar individuals. Therefore, the 
dependent’s psychological wellbeing is assumed to improve less from one hour of 
outside care than one hour of in-home care. Replacing (2) in (3), non-dependents 





 Additionally, we make the following assumptions: 
 
 
b. Spatio-temporal budget constraint: Introducing residential segregation as 
an income penalty 
 
In leisure-consumption models, individual consumption is constrained by their budget 
and time. Here, we add a spatial element (disguised as a temporal one) to individual 
constraints. Our model includes job density’s effect over commuting shares as a 
constraint to labor supply. Considering the commuting share, we define total time 
available (T) as being made up of: 
 
 
Where LS is the total labor supply, and t(j) is the commuting share, which is negatively 
correlated with job density (j). On the other hand, after normalizing commodity prices 




Where 𝛾𝛾�  is the non-labor income and 𝑅𝑅 represents the real wage. Replacing (4) in (5), 
we obtain the following spatio-temporal budget constraint: 
 
 
The commuting share, hence, acts as a discount factor on wages. 
 In summary, individuals face the following optimization problem: 
 
 









The first- and second-order conditions for the female caregivers’ optimization problem 
are in Section 1.1 in the Appendix. Men’s optimization is the same, with the difference 
being  
𝛾𝛾 = 0. Hence, any gendered difference in individual maximization can be evaluated by 
how maximization equilibria change with respect to 𝛾𝛾. If, in equilibrium, women’s care 
provision is positively affected by 𝛾𝛾, they will provide more care than men. 
 
V. CCA’s effects through the lens of our model 
 
The model presented above can help us analyze the CCA’s effects on female and male 
consumption, leisure time, domestic care provision, and labor supply. The program 
influences at least two variables. First of all, the communal factor in the program entails 
that job density (j) will increase according to local dependency rates. Secondly, the 
socialization of care from the family to the state will increase individual access to out-of-




a. Increasing job density effects on total consumption, leisure, care 
provision, and labor supply 
 
Under certain assumptions, an increase in job density will carry positive effects over 
total consumption and leisure. No additional assumptions are necessary for capturing 
job density’s negative effects over the provision of care. Section 1.2 in the Appendix 
shows the calculations for obtaining the equilibrium allocation after increasing job 






Conversely, men’s equilibrium allocation is affected in the same way as women’s, but 





Commuting shares act as a discount factor to wages. Therefore, as is common in leisure-
consumption models, an increase in perceived wages has an ambiguous effect on 
consumption. However, job density effects on consumption will be negative only at high 
levels of labor market participation.72 Since female caregivers present a priori low levels 
of labor participation, it is unlikely that consumption will decrease with higher job 
density. Men residing in low job density regions are also more likely to participate in the 
informal and part-time market (Garcia Dellacasa, 2021, Ch. I). Therefore, it is safe to 
assume that income effects will be stronger than substitution effects and consumption 
in regions where the CCA is instituted. Higher consumption signals an increase in labor 
supply that arises from decreased commuting time and less time allocated to domestic 
care activities. With higher job density, the opportunity cost of domestic care provision 
increases and, hence, its provision decreases. 
Gendered differences in job density effects depend on how the parameter 𝛾𝛾 
affects the equilibrium points.   Since  (𝑖𝑖𝑍𝑍𝑤𝑤∗ 𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗⁄ ) −  (𝑖𝑖𝑍𝑍𝑚𝑚∗ 𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗⁄ ) > 0 (due to γ > 0), 
                                                     
72 Since leisure and caring time are low at high levels of labor market participation, Θ will be large. This 
could possibly reverse job density effects.  
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women’s provision of domestic care decreases less than men’s provision. Therefore, at 
the social level, higher job density may create more significant inequalities in the 
distribution of unpaid domestic care while reducing the provision of domestic care for 
both men and women. Gendered expectations entail that women’s labor supply is more 
inelastic than men’s to changes in job density.  
 
b. Higher access to public care and the importance of trust  
 




These results underscore the importance of trust for determining the economic impact 
of the CCA. When trust in out-of-household care is high, female and male caregivers will 
be more willing to change caring hours for leisure and paid labor. Notice, moreover, that 
gendered expectations do not affect these results. We would observe gendered 
differences only if trust levels are different for men and women.  
 The economic performance of the CCA program depends on its ability to get 
people to trust it. The fact that the Care Aides will be a part of the dependent’s 
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community facilitates trust. However, this may not be enough. For this reason, 
allocating resources to trust-building and allowing local organizations to be a part of the 
planning process is of utmost importance. 
 
VI. Alternative policies for economic reactivation and care provision 
 
The CCA is an ambitious program. For this reason, it is necessary to evaluate it against 
the backdrop of other proposals that have similar goals. Here we have chosen two 
policies proposed in the current election year: a universal basic income (UBI) and paying 
domestic caregivers. The UBI’s main objective is to reactivate the economy through a 
push in aggregate demand while paying domestic caregivers has been framed in the 
context of addressing patriarchal exploitation of female labor. Here, we evaluate these 
policies through the model presented above. 
 
a. Universal Basic Income 
 
The profound economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has led congress and other 
politicians to consider implementing a UBI.73 74 As of late, at least one presidential 
campaign has included a UBI that ensures a poverty line transfer as a part of their 







platform.75 Supporters of the UBI claim that it is an effective tool for boosting aggregate 
demand and economic reactivation.76 77 UBI’s effects on the distribution of unpaid work 
is absent from their discourse. 
 In our model, the UBI can is an increase in every individual’s non-labor income 
(𝛾𝛾�). Following Section 1.4 in the Appendix, we find that female caregiver’s response to 
the UBI is: 
 
 
As expected, the UBI increases total consumption. Moreover, it bears no consequences 
over the provision and distribution of care. Therefore, an increment in leisure time 
entails that hours of labor supply will be crowded out of the market. Gendered 
expectations have no impact over UBI’s effects.  
 
b. Paying domestic caretakers 
 








Another idea that has come up during this election year combines the CCA and the UBI. 
At least one presidential candidate has proposed to pay 75% of the monthly minimum 
wage to domestic caregivers in low-income households (poorest 40%).78 The candidate 
and his allies have argued that this would be an effective policy “towards ending the 
patriarchal society.”79 However, the mechanisms through which this would happen are 
unclear. 
 To analyze this policy through the lens of our model, we need to slightly tweak 
budget constraints to: 
 
Where 𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐  is the transfer associated with one hour of domestic care. 
 The effects of this program on women’s total consumption, leisure, and caring 
time are: 
  







The effects on consumption and leisure depend on the relationship between the value 
of the domestic care transfer and the discounted wage rate. If 𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐 > 𝑅𝑅 1 + 𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗)� , total 
consumption and leisure time will increase with the program. Moreover, the effect on 
care provision also depends on the discounted wage rate. Although always positive, the 
lower the discounted wage rate, the higher the provision of care. Hence, paying for 
domestic caregiving may entail very different effects for lower-income and wealthy 
individuals. Lower-income people living in segregated communities face lower 
discounted wage rates. Therefore, they will increase their consumption by allocating 
more time to caregiving. They will also increase their leisure time. Hence, their labor 
supply will decrease. The effects of the program on wealthy individual’s labor supply, on 
the other hand, is undetermined. The effect of paying domestic caregivers over labor 
supply marks a significant departure from paying community caregiving through the 
CCA. 
 These effects are also gendered. Due to gendered expectations, it is likely that 
𝑍𝑍𝑤𝑤∗ > 𝑍𝑍𝑚𝑚∗ .80 Moreover, 
𝜕𝜕(𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝑤𝑤∗ 𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐⁄ )
𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾� > 0 and 
𝜕𝜕(𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤∗ 𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐⁄ )
𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾� > 0, meaning that 
women’s consumption and leisure time will increase at a higher rate (or decrease at a 
lower rate) than men’s. Since 𝜕𝜕(𝑖𝑖𝑍𝑍𝑤𝑤
∗ 𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐⁄ )
𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾� < 0, men will increase their provision of 
care at a higher rate than women. The program would increase the household provision 
of domestic care and equalize the social provision of care between men and women. 
                                                     
80 Unless both men and women reach a ceiling of care provision. For example, if 𝑍𝑍𝑤𝑤∗ > 𝑍𝑍𝑚𝑚∗ > 𝑇𝑇,  then men 





VII. Comparing policies using a parametric model 
 
We use a simplified parametric version of the model to compare the economic effects of 
the CCA, UBI, and paying domestic caregivers. The simulations only consider a segment 
of the population. Namely, non-dependent adults who reside with dependent adults. 
Additionally, the comparative analysis considers two aspects of each program for this 
subset of the population: their effects on economic growth (aggregate demand and 
aggregate supply) and their effects on economic inequality (average-income households 
versus high-income households and gender inequalities). We also analyze the effects of 
each program on the distribution of domestic care.  The parameters of the model were 
chosen according to available baseline data.  
 Non-dependent women’s optimization process is: 
 
 
Men maximize the same function with 𝛾𝛾 = 0. In this parametric model, 𝐴𝐴(𝑁𝑁) =
−𝑆𝑆(𝑁𝑁) = 𝑁𝑁𝜅𝜅. The model maintains the properties of the theoretical model presented 
above. Initially, we assume that there is no source of out-of-home care. Therefore, 𝑁𝑁 =
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𝑍𝑍. For simplicity, we assume 𝛼𝛼 = 𝜅𝜅 = 0.5. Real wages (𝑅𝑅) were set according to the 
2017 Family Budgets Survey (FBS), the most comprehensive income and spending 
survey in Chile.81 Since we normalized prices before, we must do the same in our 
baseline model. Thus, we define real wages as the ratio between average income over 
average spending. According to the FBS, the average ratio between income and 
spending is 1.04. Hence, we define real wages at that level. The average commuting 
share (𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗)), as per the 2012 ODS, is 25%. Additionally, according to the 2015 National 
Time Use Survey82 the average time spent in care by women residing with dependents is 
3.27 hours while men spend 1.73 hours in active care. β and γ were adjusted accordingly 
to 𝛽𝛽 = 1.2 and 𝛾𝛾 = 0.45.   
 This model is solved in Section 2.1 of the Appendix, giving the following 
equilibrium allocation for women and men, respectively: 
 
 
a. Caveats in simulation analysis 
 
Before analyzing the economic potential of each program, we must address some 
caveats in the simulation exercise. First of all, the implementation of these programs will 
likely require tax reform. Although taxes may affect aggregate demand, the model 





presented above does not consider them. The analysis, therefore, assumes a post-
reform scenario, where taxes are a sunk cost. This scenario is not unlikely. Most 
candidates, including the more economically conservative ones, have proposed to 
increase tax collection. The proposals range from increasing the tax collection by 3%83 of 
GDP to 11%.84  
 The second caveat is that the programs’ economic effects are only examined for 
the subpopulation of non-dependent adults living with dependent adults. However, CCA 
and UBI entail effects for additional fractions of the population. Job density effects 
associated with CCA, for instance, may also benefit the non-dependent population who 
does not live with any dependents. The universal nature of the UBI implies that every 
adult receives a stipend, irrespective of their family structure. Paying domestic 
caregivers, on the other hand, only targets non-dependent adults living with dependent 
adults. Hence, for comparative purposes, the analysis is reduced to this maximum 
common denominator. 
           Finally, in our model, men and women allocate their labor independently from 
each other. Given the current distribution of dependents’ family structures, this is not a 
horrible assumption. 44% of dependents live with a single non-dependent adult, and 
less than 30% reside with at least one non-dependent woman and one non-dependent 
man (Garcia Dellacasa, 2021, Ch. II). Nevertheless, in a later section, we present a 






theoretical extension to our model analyzing the effects of the CCA in households with 
at least one woman and one man. 
 
b. Economic reactivation and cost analysis 
 
We measure the effectiveness of these policies for reactivating the economy in contrast 
to their estimated implementation costs. We use the 2017 CASEN survey, Chile’s most 
comprehensive socioeconomic survey,85 to make some back-of-the-envelope 
estimations for the policies’ cost. These estimations do not consider implementation, 
administrative, or any other form of transaction costs. 
 The CCA gross cost is calculated by imputing the sliding-scale payment presented 
in Section II to adult dependents’ unpaid caregivers in the 2017 CASEN. The CCA’s 
estimated cost is 0.756% of GDP.86 The UBI cost is calculated through a simple 
imputation of the poverty line income to every adult (18+) in a family with at least one 
dependent adult, making it 0.139% of GDP. Finally, the proposal to pay domestic 
caregivers is unclear on how many caregivers there might be in a household. However, if 
we impose a limit of one caregiver per household, the cost of paying 75% of the 
minimum wage to every unpaid caregiver is 0.789% of GDP. 
                                                     
85 http://observatorio.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/encuesta-casen 
 
86 We assume that the nearly 600,000 unpaid caregivers are enough to provide coverage for the entire 
dependent population (nearly a million). Almost the entirety of the moderate and severely dependent 
population receives care from family members. Hence, their unpaid caregivers are allocated one and one-
and-a-half monthly minimum wages, respectively. The rest of unpaid caregivers are assumed to be 
sporadic workers. 
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 We consider two factors to measure the effectiveness of these policies on 
boosting the economy. On the one hand, we calculate the effects on total consumption 
(aggregate demand) for non-dependents residing with dependents. Secondly, to assess 
if these policies may lead to inflationary pressures, we also calculate the effects on their 
labor supply (aggregate supply).87 We know from equation 8 that CCAs impact on total 
consumption and labor supply depend on the degree of trust families have in out-of-
household care provision. Therefore, we will consider three different scenarios to 
measure the impact of the CCA program: a low-trust scenario (𝜂𝜂 = 0.3), a medium-trust 
scenario (𝜂𝜂 = 0.5) and a high-trust scenario (𝜂𝜂 = 0.7). 
 
i. Total consumption and aggregate demand in the examined 
subpopulation 
 
Table 15 summarizes the effects of each program on total consumption for non-
dependent adults residing with dependents. The last column in Table 15 shows the 
spending efficacy of each program in increasing total consumption. The Table shows 
that the CCA is the program that carries the most significant impact on total 
consumption.88 However, its effectiveness depends on at least two variables. First of all, 
trust in the program is crucial. The more people trust in the program, the more likely 
                                                     
87 The analysis for each program can be found in the Mathematical Appendix, Section 2. 
 
88 We have assumed that the CCA program offers six hours of care a day. 
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they will trade hours of unpaid care for hours of paid labor. Therefore, aggregate 
demand effects are significantly dependent on trust levels.  
 The second factor to consider is if there are minimum floors to the provision of 
care. CCAs may not be able to meet all caring needs. For instance, some dependents 
may need assistance in the middle of the night when CCAs will not be available to 
provide it. This would mean that the minimum floors for reducing the domestic care 
provision could be higher than zero. For simplicity, in this model, we have considered 
the floor to be zero. Due to gendered expectations, men reach that floor faster than 
women, and total consumption increments reach its ceiling at 12.48%. However, the 
higher the minimum floor for the provision of unpaid domestic care, the lower the 
program’s effect on economic growth. 
 
Table 15: Policy effects on total consumption percentage point change. 
 
  
 Another attractive characteristic of the CCA program is that even when 
economic reactivation is not its primary objective and trust in the program is low, it 
performs similarly to the UBI. When trust is higher, the CCA outperforms the UBI. Paying 
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domestic caregivers is, by far, the less profitable program. The reason behind this very 
mild increase is an extreme crowding-out from the paid labor market into the newly 
paid domestic caregiving sector. Here, we have assumed a ceiling on the provision of 
domestic care to six hours. Since the pay is lower than the discounted wage rate, the 
effects on total consumption are positive but low. Men actually decrease their total 
consumption. 
 
ii. Effects on labor supply and inflationary pressures 
 
After the current economic crisis, it is unlikely that people will continue to step out of 
the labor force. Therefore, crowding-out effects are improbable in the short term. As 
the economy stabilizes, however, their likelihood becomes higher and inflationary 
pressures may arise. Table 16 shows significant differences between the programs’ 
effects on labor supply. 
 




The CCA is the only program that increases the labor supply. Therefore, it is best suited 
to generate real impacts on the economy as it minimizes the likelihood of inflationary 
pressures. Paying domestic caregivers, on the other hand, generates the highest 
contraction in aggregate supply. 
 
c. Economic and gender inequality 
 
We can analyze two sources of economic inequality through our model: i) wage 
inequalities in the labor market and ii) territorial inequalities emerging from differences 
in job density. Additionally, we can analyze the policy effects in within- and between 
gender-inequality.89 
Here we consider high-earning individuals to earn double the average wage rate. 
According to our model, and assuming equal job density between households, average 
wage earners consume 45.8% of high-earners consumption. This ratio assumes equal 
job density. If we assume that job density is higher in high-income neighborhoods, then 
inequality in consumption would be even more significant.90  
 
i. Policy effects over consumption inequalities: 
 
                                                     
89 In Section 2.1.1 in the Mathematical Appendix we find the base allocation for women and men who 
perceive wages at double the average rate. 
 
90 This means that unpaid care deepens inequalities in consumption. 
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Table 17 shows the change in the consumption ratio between average earners and high-
earners. Here, we can see that the CCA and the UBI policy can decrease inequality in 
consumption. The CCA’s effectiveness once again depends on the level of trust in the 
program. Inequality reduction will go hand-in-hand with trust levels. Paying domestic 
caregivers, on the other hand, may produce the opposite result. This is because 
wealthier households are less likely to trade paid labor market hours for paid domestic 
hours. In fact, as we can see in Section 2.4.1 in the Mathematical Appendix, the increase 
in domestic care hours for high-earners is minimal. 
  
Table 17: Policy effects on percentage point change of the ratio between average consumption and high-earners 




ii. Territorial considerations for the CCA’s inequality effects 
 
CCA’s effects on consumption depend on how much the program can reduce domestic 
care provision and increase job density. If job creation is proportional to total 
dependents, then increments in job density will be proportional to dependency rates. 
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Therefore, residents in places with higher dependency rates (the ratio of dependents to 
adults) will benefit more from the program. 
 Poorer municipalities are, on average, less job dense than wealthier 
municipalities (Garcia Dellacasa 2021, Ch. I). Table 18 shows the linear relationship 
between dependency rates (for adults and children) and average municipal income. We 
find that adult dependency rates are higher in lower-income municipalities, while there 
is no significant relationship for child dependency rates. This correlation indicates that 
lower-income jurisdictions will benefit more from the CCA than higher-income 
jurisdictions, further reducing territorial inequality. 
 
Table 18: OLS regression for dependency on average municipal income using the 2017 Casen. 
 
 
iii. Gender inequalities in consumption 
 
Given gendered expectations, men and women react differently to public policy. Hence, 
these policies will affect gender inequalities in consumption. Keeping in mind that 
inequality effects were calculates as if men and women allocate their labor 
independently of each other, columns three and four in Table 19 summarize the 
 135 
percentage point change in the ratio of total consumption for men and women 
(between-gender inequality). The ratio is defined as women’s consumption over men’s 
consumption.  The results show that, in average income households, the higher the trust 
in the CCA program, the higher the ratio of total consumption. Thus, between-gender 
inequality would decrease.  In high-income households, given that the program is less 
effective in decreasing hours of unpaid care, trust does not affect consumption 
inequality. 
 
Table 19: Policy effects on percentage point change in female to male consumption ratio. A positive value indicates 
that gaps in consumption are lowered. 
 
 Trust will affect within-gender inequality as well. Higher trust in the CCA will lead 
to lower consumption inequality between women of different economic backgrounds. 
Paying domestic caregivers will strongly reduce between-gender inequality in average 
income households. However, this is paired with an increase in men’s within-inequality 
ratio, signaling that higher equality in average income households may not necessarily 
signal better material conditions for all homes. 
 
iv. The distribution of domestic care work 
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Gendered expectations lead women to provide the lion’s share of domestic work.  
Moreover, Chile’s familial care system relies excessively on household members to 
provide care for adult dependents. According to our baseline data, female-led 
households provide 3.27 hours of domestic care, and male-led homes provide 1.73 
hours. This means that women provide 65.4% of total domestic care.91 The programs 
have very distinct effects on the distribution of unpaid care. The CCA socializes care to 
communities and the state, decreasing the load of domestic care. The UBI bears no 
effects on the distribution of care. Moreover, paying domestic caregivers increments the 
reliance of dependents on domestic care.   
 Table 20 summarizes the effects on the total provision of unpaid care and the 
female share of domestic care provision: 
 
Table 20: Policy effects on the provision of domestic care. 
 
 
                                                     
91 This estimate is pretty close to the gender distribution of unpaid caregivers for adult dependents. 
According to the 2017 CASEN, 67.8% of unpaid caregivers are women. 
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The Table shows that paying domestic caregivers may be the best equalizer in the 
distribution of domestic work. It does so, however, by severely increasing the supply of 
domestic care. On the other hand, the CCA reduces the reliance on domestic care, but it 
makes its gender distribution more skewed at medium and low levels of trust.92  
 
VIII. Allocation in families: A theoretical extension  
 
Thus far, we have considered that men and women residing with dependents maximize 
their utility independent from each other. Although smaller households are becoming 
increasingly common, nearly 30% of adult dependents still reside in extended families.93 
In these households, family decision-making processes influence individual allocation. 
Traditional neoclassical models of the family assume the household as a single-
maximizing unit (Becker, 1985). Feminist economists have disputed this amicable 
perspective of the family, arguing that conflict and bargaining processes are crucial to 
family decision-making (Folbre, 2012; Beneria et al., 2015 Political, economic, and 
cultural factors inform bargaining power. However, fallback positions, or exit threats, 
have been syndicated as a crucial component (Chant and McIlwaine 2016, p.79; Folbre, 
                                                     
92 It must be noted that the extreme change in distribution for the CCA program is due to our assumption 
of a zero-care floor. If people were to reduce their care to a fixed positive number of hours of care, the 
distribution would be less skewed (and the program would also be less effective in stimulating 
consumption). 
 
93 According to 2017 CASEN. See Garcia Dellacasa 2021, Ch. II. 
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2021).94 Exit threats refer to the individual’s resource allocation in case they were to exit 
the family relationship. This theoretical extension discusses how policies may affect the 
family decision-making process through changes in exit threats through a non—
cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium analysis (Chen and Woolley, 2001). 
The first thing to note is that the individual maximization presented above is the 
de-facto exit threat for men and women, i.e., how much care they would provide if they 
exited the relationship. If there are no barriers to exit, men and women can leave the 
relationship and allocate their time according to the individual maximization model. 
However, men and women may use their bargaining power to negotiate non-exit 
outcomes. The bargaining position, conversely, will depend on the degree of 
interdependence between the two parties.  
We can slightly tweak our model to integrate interdependency into our model. 
Following a similar structure to equation 2, let us assume that in a heterosexual 
traditional extended family, the total provision of care is determined by: 
 
𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 is the total provision of care perceived by non-dependent women, and 𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚 is the 
total provision of care perceived by non-dependent men. Note that the role of care 
provisioning in individual maximization has a slightly different interpretation. Now it is 
interpreted from the perspective of the caregiver. Furthermore, we assume that both 
                                                     
94 Bargaining power is a complex social construct conditioned by Institutional, political, cultural, and social 
institutions (Elson 1999). 
 139 
men and women value their personal provisioning of care at the highest (unitary) rate. 
However, due to gendered expectations, we will assume that women’s trust in male 
care is lower than men’s trust in female care (𝛿𝛿 < 1).95 
 Assuming a non-cooperative Cournot equilibrium, any change in exogenous 
factors is evaluated against the backdrop of the partner’s respective reaction function. 




Therefore, the reaction functions can be written and rearranged as: 
 
 
Where 𝑍𝑍𝑁𝑁 is the Nash equilibrium care provision. Equation 17 tells us that whenever 
men’s exit provision is equal or greater than women’s, male care will be equal to zero 
(or whatever the floor provision is). Additionally, if there are barriers to exiting the 
                                                     
95 Possibly a result of social conditioning. 
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relationship, and women’s exit provision is higher than men’s, female provision of care 
may be higher than the value of the exit provision. Finally, the magnitude of women’s 
care provision (and, hence, their labor supply) depends on the difference between 
feminine and masculine exit strategies. Since men’s care provision is zero, women 
provide exit-threat level care, and a sexual division of labor emerges. 
 Due to gendered expectations, women’s provision of care when exiting the 
relationship is always equal or higher than that of men for the policies analyzed above. 
Even though the CCA policy would increase female labor supply at a higher rate (the 
difference between exit strategies is less), it would still lead to a skewed distribution of 
domestic care.96 There is, however, a theoretical possibility for the CCA to distribute 
domestic care work more equitably. To see this, we need to remember that the exit 
strategy is conditional on job density. When job density is higher, the exit provision of 
care decreases.  
Thus far, we have assumed that men and women face similar job densities. 
However, gendered occupational segregation in the labor market may entail different 
local job densities for men and women in the same household (Garcia Dellacasa 2021, 
Ch. I). If the CCA were to create jobs at a higher proportion for women than for men, 
women’s exit strategies would decrease faster. If female job density increases 
                                                     
96 Furthermore, in contrast to the individual maximization process, paying domestic caregivers would 
most likely result in the most skewed distribution of all under the strategic allocation. If we assume 𝛿𝛿=0.5 
in our simplified model, the non-cooperative outcome would be for women to provide six hours of care 
and men to provide zero.  
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sufficiently, a balanced distribution of care becomes a credible threat. Figure 16 
illustrates this argument: 
 
 
Figure 16: Cournot-Nash equilibrium for a sufficiently high increase in female job density. 
 
At an initial stage, men’s a women’s reaction functions do not cross. The Nash 
equilibrium at this level is a sexual division of labor where women provide 𝑍𝑍𝑤𝑤∗  and men 
provide 𝑍𝑍𝑚𝑚∗ = 0 However, a sufficiently high increment in female job density contracts 
women’s reaction function inwards. Now an internal solution is possible. Women can 
credibly threaten to provide 𝑍𝑍𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁, at which point men provide 𝑍𝑍𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁 > 0. Even in the 
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presence of gendered expectations, women’s improvement in their fallback position 
may trigger a negotiation and a more just distribution of unpaid work. It is also worth 
noticing that if the changes in job density are too small, the sexual division will persist 
(no internal solution). 
 Since families do cooperate, a non-cooperative equilibrium is unlikely. However, 
this equilibrium replaces the exit strategy as a credible threat of non-cooperation (Chen 
and Woolley 2001). Job density, therefore, may induce a bargaining process that does 
not necessarily rely on the threat of or barriers to exiting the relationship. 
 This theoretical possibility also raises a possible moral conundrum for the CCA 
program. A gendered distribution of paid community care may lead to greater equality 
in the gender distribution of unpaid domestic care. It is not in the scope of this paper to 
discuss the implications of this trade-off, but it is important to acknowledge its 
theoretical feasibility. 
 
IX. Final remarks 
 
The CCA program is an ambitious idea to transform Chile’s care system. The program is 
expected to the coverage and quality of adult care even as it improves the working 
conditions of caregivers. Moreover, the program’s also entails economic benefits arising 
from increasing job density in economically depressed regions and decreasing unpaid 
work hours for caregivers, especially women. This article provides theoretical evidence 
for the mechanisms behind the program’s economic impacts. 
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           The CCA applies one of the oldest premises in the economics discipline. The 
community aspect of the program allows for a division of labor which is challenging if 
not impossible for households, especially for smaller ones. By expanding the limits of 
the division of labor, the CCA introduces efficiency to care provision, liberating 
thousands of unpaid hours of work. Additionally, the CCA targets the more temporally 
and spatially constrained communities, driving economic growth through inequality 
reduction. 
           The model presented in this article shows that decreasing unpaid care work will 
increase total consumption and labor supply, especially for women. Therefore, the 
CCA’s simultaneous effects on aggregate demand and aggregate supply boost real 
economic growth without generating inflationary pressures often associated with high 
fiscal spending. Furthermore, given that the program will disproportionately benefit 
regions with high dependency rates, the CCA will decrease inequality between low- and 
high-income households and gender inequalities. 
           Within the assumptions of this model, the CCA program outperforms the UBI and 
paying domestic caregivers as an economic policy. However, the economic performance 
of the CCA is contingent upon people’s trust in community caregiving. The significance 
of trust calls for planning and implementation methods that seriously consider local 
needs. Therefore, state authorities need to collaborate with local organizations 
throughout the process of transforming Chile’s system of care.
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APPENDIX A 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1 
A.1 Comparison between ODS and 2012 census 
Defining low-skilled potential workers as those who, at most, hold a high school degree, 
I compare the representativity of the ODS to the 2012 census in Table A-1. The table 
indicates that the weighted observations from the ODS dataset and the population 
parameters are similar in magnitude.  
 
Table A-1: Summary of basic labor statistics comparing ODS 2012 and the 2012 Census. Calculations using survey 
weights. The working-age is between 15 and 65 years of age for the greater Santiago area. 
 
A.2 Moran’s I 
Moran’s I is expressed as: 
 
𝐼𝐼 =  
𝑁𝑁
∑ ∑ 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗=1𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1
∑ ∑ 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗(𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 − 𝑒𝑒�)(𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗 − 𝑒𝑒�)𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗=1𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1
∑ (𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 − 𝑒𝑒�)2𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1
 
 
Where 𝑁𝑁 is equal to the number of observations, 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 is the matrix which represents the 
degree of influence between observation i and observation j (usually known as the 
 145 
‘distance weight matrix’), and 𝑒𝑒 is the outcome or variable for which spatial correlation 
is tested.  The numerator represents the covariance between observations and their 
neighbors, while the denominator is the global variance. The outcome is thus a 
normalized outcome, which takes the value of -1 when the data is negatively perfectly 
clustered, 1 when it is positively perfectly clustered and 0 when it is dispersed or 
random. 
 This indicator, especially when it comes to social and economic analysis,  is not 
free from assumptions. A distance weight matrix defines the relationship between 
neighbors. However, how do we quantify this relationship? There are several ways in 
which one can specify this matrix (Gibbons, Overman and Patacchini 2015, p. 128-131), 
which often depends on the nature of the dataset. In the simplest of cases, a region that 
shares its borders with four other regions would have a matrix that allocated a weight of 
¼ to each of the bordering regions. Thus, in this case, the assumption would be that all 
of the bordering regions have the same degree of influence over the region of interest. 
Regions that do not share a border, on the other hand, have no influence over each 
other. 
 Observations in the ODS are identified at the household level. This allows us for a 
more refined definition for spatial autocorrelation. Assuming that closer neighbors are 
more likely to experience similar alternatives to outsource care, the distance weight 
matrix is constructed according to an inverse distance weight structure. This means that 
neighbors that are closer are assigned larger weights than those who reside further 
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away. Moreover, I have limited the definition of neighbor to the 50 closest neighbors at 
less than 1000 meters from the household coordinates. 
 
A.3 Technical explanation for local boundaries 
 
Our definition of locality is the point where people are indifferent between 
walking (or cycling) and taking a motorized form of transportation. Beyond this point, 
people are more willing to assume greater accounting costs in order to reach their 
destinations. This definition is particularly relevant in the Chilean case, where the cost of 
transportation is particularly high for low-income residents. In fact, according to the 
2017 Family Budget Survey97, out-of-pocket spending in transportation is only lower to 
expenditures in food and non-alcoholic drinks. Moreover, a subway fare hike of CLP$30 
(US$0.05) in 2019 resulted in a social crisis which eventually led to a process of 
constitutional transformation.   
The 2012 ODS recorded over 113,000 trips for that year. However, not all people 
face similar commuting costs. Chilean students’ public transportation use is heavily 
subsidized by the state. For 2012, the bus fares costed $590 (CLP) for non-student users 
and $190 for students. Similarly, people over 65 years of age are beneficiaries of a 
subway subsidy. There are also individuals who face higher constrains to non-motorized 





mobility. People with disabilities may be indifferent between non-motorized travel and 
motorized travel at a much lower distance. Thus, to obtain the point of indifference we 
consider only adults between 18 and 65 years of age who are not enrolled in an 
educational institution and are not physically constrained by disability. For this sub-
group, the ODS recorded 70,627 trips using motorized or non-motorized modes of 
transportation. 
 We define the indifference point as that one where the probabilities of using 
motorized transportation is equal to that of walking or cycling. Figure A-1 summarizes 
the trips recorded in the ODS using survey weights and bins all trips according to the 
Euclidean distance between origin and destination in 100-meter intervals. On the left 
panel we can see that short trips are much more common than longer trips. However, 
the variable of interest is in the right panel. At what distance are people indifferent 
between motorized and non-motorized transportation? On average, this seems to take 
place at the 1,000-meter difference between origin and destination of trip. At this point 
51% of trips are non-motorized. Moreover, the steepest declines in non-motorized 
modes of transportation are between 900 and 1,000 meters, and between 1,000 and 
1,100 meters. Together, the decline in preference for non-motorized modes of 
transportation amounts to 28% of total trips. Only 37% of trips between 1,000 and 
1,100 meters are non-motorized. Hence, our first approximation to defining locality is a 




Figure A-17: Trips in the 2012 ODS. The left panel represents the total amount of trips categorized by one hundred-
meter intervals and mode of transportation for working age adults. The right panel shows the distribution of utilized 
means of transportation per every one hundred-meter interval. When non-motored travel is at 50%, individuals are 
equally likely to travel through motored and non- motored means of transportation. Source: 2012 ODS. 
 
 There is, however, at least one caveat with this initial measure of locality: The 
point of indifference considers both public transportation and private vehicles. 
Nevertheless, there are families that do not possess private vehicles, so their choices are 
split between non-motorized and public transportation (and carpooling to a lesser 
extent). Nearly half of the aforementioned trips recorded by the ODS were taken by 
people who do not own a private vehicle (35,784). Unsurprisingly, the point of 
indifference for these travelers is higher (Figure A-2). At 1,400 meters, 49.5% of all trips 
are non-motorized. 100 meters later, only 37% percent of all trips take place under this 
mode of transportation. Public transportation, on the other hand, represent 53% of all 
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trips at this point.  In fact, the change in the percentual composition of total travel is the 
second largest only to the change between 1,000 and 1,100. 
 
 
Figure A-18:Trips in the 2012 ODS for individuals who do not own private vehicles. The left panel represents the total 
amount of trips categorized by one hundred-meter intervals and mode of transportation for working age adults who 
do not own private means of motored transportation. The right panel shows the distribution of utilized means of 
transportation per every one hundred-meter interval. When non-motored travel is at 50%, individuals are equally likely 
to travel through motored and non-motored means of transportation. Source: 2012 ODS. 
Thus, a larger radius of 1,400 meters will be considered for households that do 
not possess a vehicle. The walking-distance radius approach to defining local markets 
reduces the possibility of MAUP in at least two ways. First of all, our conceptualization 
of locality is directly related to the importance of local markets on employment 
decisions. Secondly, no observation is near the border of their own locality. Another 
important property of this definition of locality is that it allows for overlapping local 
markets. The radius approach allows for two workers may compete between each other 
without leaving their personal local markets even when they reside in different 
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localities, a characteristic of local labor markets that has been stressed by the literature 
(Manning and Petrongolo 2017). 
 
A.4 Local Indicators of Spatial Association (LISA) 








(𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗 − 𝑒𝑒�) 
 
As Felkner and Townsend argue: “The statistic is a measure of the strength of the 
spatial correlation of an observation with its neighbors” (2013, p. 2054). If the spatial 
correlation is positive, both the observation and its neighbors are simultaneously 
beneath or above the mean when it comes to mobility. If the statistic is negative, on the 
other hand, the observation’s mobility and its neighbors will be intersected by the 
mean. The statistic is then tested for significance against the backdrop of complete 
spatial randomness. To identify spatial clusters, a conditional 
randomization/permutation approach is used to obtain pseudo significance levels 
(Hubert 1987 in Felkner and Townsend 2013). Through this approach these clusters can 







APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2 
 
B.1 Statistical differences in the determinants of being cared for between low 
dependency population and average dependent population. 
 
Table B-1 presents t-tests for the difference in coefficients for the distinct population 
subsets (Low levels of dependency minus average dependency).  T-tests for each 
difference show that these are more significant in households that are less likely to 
internalize care. Therefore, an extreme reliance in household care may result in a large 
fraction of the dependent population not receiving early care. 
 
Table B-21: T-tests comparing the family type coefficients of being cared for between low dependency individuals and 
average dependents. 
 
B.2 Machine Learning methods for predicting dependency 
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In order to predict dependency, I will choose the best model emerging from six different 
algorithms: Logistic regression, stepwise regression, ridge regression, lasso regression, 
over-grown tree, and a random forest algorithm. Brief descriptions of each of these 
algorithms can be found in Table B-2.  
 
Table B-22: Short description of each predicting method used for the analysis of adult dependency. 
 
 
Traditionally, machine learning models are evaluated according to two 
alternative measurements. The ROCC curve represents the tradeoff between the true 
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positive rate (also known as ‘sensitivity’) and the false positive rate (1-‘specificity’) of 
our predictions98. Ideally, a prediction would have a true positive rate of one and a false 
positive rate of zero, and the ROCC curve would take the shape of an inverted ‘L’. An 
alternative to the ROCC curve is the ‘Precision-Recall’ curve. In this case, we evaluate 
models according to their capability to simultaneously maximize true positive rates 
(same as in the ROCC curve, now labeled ‘recall’) and precision.99 Here, the ideal model 
would yield a precision and a recall equal to one, and the Precision-Recall curve would 
have its vertex in the top-right corner of a one-by-one graph.  
We choose according to how close they are to perfect prediction. These curves 
also allow us to choose the optimal prediction threshold for dependency. Instead of 
arbitrarily choosing 0.5 as the cutting point for dependency predictions, we choose the 
threshold that minimizes the ROCC curve tradeoff and maximizes the Prediction-Recall 
curve. In other words, the thresholds by which we obtain the points closer to the top-
left and top-right corners, respectively. These are calculated through the Youden Index 
(for ROCC curves) and F-1 scores (for Precision-Recall curves). 
The ROCC curve and the Precision-Recall curve will most likely yield different 
thresholds as optimal. How do we choose between them? The answer lies in the nature 
of our classification and how affects the different. Dependency is an imbalanced 
                                                     












variable, as only 7% of the training dataset corresponds to dependents, Hence, it is likely 
that false positive rates will increase very slowly (true negatives will probably be very 
high). Precision, on the other hand, is unaffected by this imbalance, since it only focuses 
on positive values. For this reason, when we prioritize precision for choosing the 
appropriate threshold false positive rates do not shoot through the roof. Figures B-1 and 
B-2 illustrates both curves and their optimal threshold points.  
 
 
Figure B-19: Precision-Recall curve for different models. Optimal thresholds 
that maximize F-1 scores for each model are represented with a ‘+’. The 
dotted line represents a ‘chance’ prediction. 
 
Figure B-20: ROCC curve for different models. Optimal thresholds that 
maximize the Youden Index for each model are represented with a triangle. 
Precision-Recall optimal thresholds are represented with a ‘+’. The dotted 
line represents a ‘chance’ prediction. 
 
  
 Table B-3 summarizes the performance for each model in predicting dependency 
on the testing data. Since precision is prioritized, we chose the model that yields the 
optimal thresholds with the maximum F-1 score. In this case, it is the random forest 
model. Coincidentally, when maximizing precision, the random forest model also yields 
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the highest Youden-Index, signaling that it minimizes the tradeoff between true and 
false positive rates. This model also maximizes the accuracy of our predictions.100 
 




B.3 Predictors  
 
Table B-4 summarizes the variables used to predict dependency, comparing the means 
for dependents and non-dependents in the training data. 
 
                                                     
100 𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒 =  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃+𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃+𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃+𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃+𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃
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Table B-24: Variables used as dependency predictors. Statistics are for the training data. 
 
 
B.4 Capturing family distributions in testing data 
Figure B-3 compares the actual distribution of dependents’ family types with the 
predicted distributions in the testing data (divided into 2015 testing data and 2017 
testing data). Since training and testing data were chosen at random, many households 
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were split between the different datasets. Therefore, it is not strange that we have an 
overrepresentation of dependents living alone in the testing data. This is not something 
to worry about, since family types were not utilized as a predicting variable. Moreover, 
the Figure shows that the predictions accurately capture the dependents’ family 
distributions. Tables B-5 and B-6 provide statistical reassurance to this visual inspection. 
The Pearson Chi-squared test and the Log likelihood ratio test show that Random Forest 
predictions are statistically equally distributed to the actual distribution. 
 
 
Figure B-21: Comparison between the actual distribution of dependents' family types and the predicted distributions in 
the testing data. For illustrative purposes, the testing data has been divided by year. 
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Table B-25: Goodness-of-fit tests comparing the actual distribution of dependents to that of predicted dependents in 




Table B-26: Goodness-of-fit tests comparing the actual distribution of dependents to that of predicted dependents in 










MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 
 
C.1 Labor supply model for women residing with dependents under gendered 
expectations 
C.1.1. First and second order conditions  
In this model, women maximize the following utility function: 
 
subject to: 
Uw = u(X,L) + βA(N) − γS(N) (A-1) 
                                                         ) (A-2) 
Thus, the Lagrangian equation is: 
                                                                                                                           ) (A-3) 
First order conditions: 
= 0                      (A-4) 
                 
                                          = 0                                           (A-5) 
 
                                                           = 0                                     (A-6)  
 
= 0                               (A-7) 
 
The bordered Hessian for the second order conditions would look like this: 
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   (A-8) 
To find a local maximum, the second order conditions have to satisfy: 
 −det|H3| < 0 
 
and (A-9) 
 −det|H4| > 0 




If  = 0. Therefore, if this common assumption is 
satisfied, second order conditions are always satisfied. 
C.1.2. Job density effects on female caregivers’ labor supply 
 
From equations 4, 5, 6, and 7 we get the following system of equations: 
  = 0  
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To capture job density effects we differentiate 12 considering 




  (A-13) 
In matrix form, this can be converted to: 
  (A- 14) 
 
With Θ =                                              0 and (T − L − Z) 
. 
Following the same steps, it can be shown that men’s optimization problem can be 
written as101: 
  (A-15) 
C.1.2.1. Job density effects on total consumption  
                                                     
101 Men’s determinant would be exactly the same to 
women’s with γ=0 
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Using Cramer’s rule, we know that: 
  (A-16) 
With 
  (A-17) 
Since au’’LL – bu’’LX = 0, we know that det|M| > 0 
For det|MXj |, we can arrive at the following formulation: 
  (A-18) 
102This means that dX/dj > 0 when we don’t consider altruism and social penalty effects, 
and job density effects on consumption decrease with higher values of β or γ. Since γ = 0 
for men, men increment their consumption more at similar levels of job density than 
women do. 
C.1.2.2. Job density effects on leisure time 
                                                     
102 The sign of               will depend on the value of Θ.  






 0            (A-21) 
Notice that in the absence of a social penalty and altruism effects, dL/dj > 0. However, as 
these effects grow larger (increments in β or γ), job density effects on leisure time 
become smaller (det|M| becomes larger and det|MLj| is reduced). 







 )  (A-24) 
This means that: 




C.1.2.4. Job density effects over labor supply 
 
Since dX/dj is positive, and no other source of income is changed, dLS/dj > 0. The 
functional form of dLS/dj > 0 can be calculated from out temporal restriction: 
T = (1 + t(j))LS + L + Z 
If we differentiate with dj > 0, we get: 
(A-26) 
  (A-27) 
If we replace and rearrange 27, we get: 
 0 (A-28) 
Labor supply is more inelastic on job density for women facing social penalties than for 
men. 
C.1.3. Greater public care availability and female caregivers’ labor supply 
 
To capture the effects of public care availability we differentiate 12 considering dZ > 0: 
  (A-29) 
In matrix form, this can be converted to: 
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  (A-30) 
C.1.3.1. Public care effects on total consumption 
 
 
  (A-31) 
with 
  (A-32) 
Which gives: 
 0 (A-33) 
Therefore: 
 0 (A-34) 
C.1.3.2. Public care effects on total leisure time 
 
 
  (A-35) 
with 
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  (A-36) 
Which gives: 
 0 (A-37) 
Therefore: 
 0 (A-38) 
C.1.3.3. Public care effects on total domestic caring time 
 
 
  (A-39) 
with 
  (A-40) 
Which gives: 
 0 (41) 
Therefore: 
 0 (42) 
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C.1.3.4. Public care effects on labor supply 
 
If we differentiate with dZ > 0, we get: 
  (A-43) 
Replacing and rearranging, we get: 
 0 (A-44) 
C.1.4. Universal basic income effects over female caregivers’ labor supply 
 
To capture the effects of a universal basic income policy we differentiate 12 considering 
d𝛾𝛾�  > 0:  
  (A-45) 
In matrix form, this can be converted to: 
  (A-46) 
C.1.4.1. UBI effects on total consumption 
 
 






 0 (A-49) 
Therefore: 
 0 (A-50) 
 
C.1.4.2. UBI effects on total leisure time 
 
  (A-51) 
with 
 0 0 
(A-52) 
Which gives: 
 0 (A-53) 
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Therefore: 
 0 (A-54) 
C.1.4.3. UBI effects on total domestic caring time 
 
 
  (A-55) 
with 
  (A-56) 
Which gives: 
 𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡|𝐿𝐿𝑍𝑍𝑌𝑌
�|  =  𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠′′𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  −  𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠′′𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿  =  0 (A-57) 
Therefore: 
 = 0 (A-58) 
C.1.4.4. UBI effects on labor supply 
 
If we differentiate with d𝛾𝛾�  > 0, we get: 
  (A-59) 
Replacing and rearranging, we get: 
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 0                                    (A-60) 
 
C.1.5. Paying domestic caregivers’ effects over female caregivers’ labor 
supply 
 
Now, the maximization problem is slightly different: 
 
subject to: 
Uw = u(X,L) + βA(N) − γS(N) (A-61) 
          )                                     (A-62) 
 f.o.c.: 
 (A-63) 
From which we obtain the following system of equations:    
Wu’X − (1 + t(j))u’L = 0  
U’L (w − (1 + t(j))Yc) − w(βA’N – γS’N ) = 0 (A-64) 
 




For Cramer’s rule the new denominator would be given by: 
 
 (A-66) 
If                       = 0, it can be shown that: 
 0 (A-67) 
C.1.5.1. Paying domestic caregivers’ effects on total consumption 
 





 )) (A-70) 
If , then: 
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 0 (A-71) 
Otherwise, the effect is indeterminate. 
C.1.5.2. Caring Pension effects on total leisure time 





 )) (A-74) 
If                         , then: 
 0 (A-75) 
Otherwise, the effect is indeterminate. 
C.1.5.3. Caring pension effects on total domestic caring time 






 0 (A-78) 
Therefore: 
 0 (A-79) 
C.1.5.4. Caring pension effects on labor supply  
 
If we differentiate with dY c > 0, we get: 
  (A-80) 
Replacing and rearranging, we get: 
 0
 (A-81) 
If                         , then: 
 0 (A-82) 
 174 
C.2 Comparative parametric model 
 
C.2.1. Base model 
Women maximize the following utility function 
 
𝑈𝑈𝑤𝑤  =  𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿(1−𝛼𝛼)  +  𝛽𝛽𝑍𝑍𝜅𝜅  −  𝛾𝛾(−𝑍𝑍𝜅𝜅) 
subject to: 
(A-83) 
 )                                         (A-84) 
The parameters of the model are given by: α = κ = 0.5, t(j) = 0.25, β = 1.2, γ = 0.45, w = 1.04. 
The Lagrangean would then look like this: 
 





  (A-86) 
From the f.o.c., we know that: 
 0.832L∗ = X∗ 
0.8320.5 
Therefore, in equilibrium: 
= (β + γ)Z∗−0.5 (A-87) 
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  (A-88) 




C.2.1.1. Base allocation for wages = 2w 
Following the same steps as above it can be shown that when wages are doubled, the 
optimal allocation for women is: 
 64 ; 95 ; 18 ;  (A-90) 
And for men: 
 87 ; 59 ; 57 ;  (A-91) 
C.2.2. Community care aides program 
The program presupposes an increase in job density by 10% (a reduction in the 
commuting share by 0.5%) and an increase in the provision of public care to six hours. 
We will assume that dependents value out of household care at 0.3 times the rate they 
value domestic provision. The new Lagrangean would be: 
Lw = X0.5L0.5 + (β + γ)(Z + 0.3 ∗ 6)0.5 + λ(0.835(16 − L − Z) − X) (A-92)  
f.o.c: 
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  (A-93) 
In equilibrium: 
  (A-94) 




C.2.2.1. CCA allocation for wages = 2w 
Following the same steps as above it can be shown that when wages are doubled, the 
optimal allocation for women is: 
 = 0 ; 37 ; = 8 ;  (A-96) 
And for men: 
 = 0 ; 37 ; = 8 ;  (A-97) 
C.2.3. Universal Basic Income 
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The program promises an increase in autonomous income by $CLP112,527 (in 2017). 
This is equivalent to 29% of the average individual expenditure. The new Lagrangean 
would be: 
Lw = X0.5L0.5 + (β + γ)Z0.5 + λ(0.29 + 0.832(16 − L − Z) − X) 






C.2.3.1. UBI allocation for wages = 2w 
Following the same steps as above it can be shown that when wages are doubled, the 
optimal allocation for women is: 
 64 ; 09 ; 27 ;  (A-100) 
And for men: 
 87 ; 73 ; 65 ;  (A-101) 
C.2.4. Paying domestic caregivers 
The program promises to pay 75% of the minimum wage to unpaid domestic workers. 
This is equivalent to 51% of average spending. We will assume that the maximum 
 178 
number of hours a person can care for is 75% of full employment maximum number of 
hours is full time employment (6.8 hours) The new Lagrangean would be: 
 Lw = X0.5L0.5 + (β + γ)Z0.5 + λ(0.51Z + 0.832(16 − L − Z) − X) (A-102) 
f.o.c: 
  (A-103) 
In equilibrium: 
  (A-104) 




C.2.4.1. Paying domestic caregivers, allocation for wages = 2w 
Following the same steps as above it can be shown that when wages are doubled, the 
optimal allocation for women is: 
 7 ; 33 ; 41 ;  (A-106) 
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And for men: 
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